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THE TWIN AIMS OF ERIE
Michael Steven Green*
We all remember the twin aims of the Erie rule from first-year civil procedure. A
federal court sitting in diversity must use forum state law if it is necessary to avoid
“forum shopping” and the “inequitable administration of the laws.” This Article offers
a reading of the twin aims and a systematic analysis of their proper role in federal and
state court. I argue that the twin aims apply in diversity cases not because they protect
state interests, but because they serve the federal purposes standing behind the diversity
statute. So understood, they are about separation of powers, not federalism. Through
the twin aims, state law is incorporated into federal procedural common law in order to
serve federal interests.
This reading does not merely have important consequences for diversity cases. It
also has an impact on the role of the twin aims outside diversity. If the twin aims have
their source in the purposes standing behind the congressional grant of jurisdiction,
rather than respect for state interests, the fact that a federal court entertains a state law
action is neither a necessary nor a sufficient reason for the twin aims to apply. The
twin aims might apply to federal courts when entertaining federal causes of action.
Conversely, they might not apply to a federal court when entertaining state law actions
under jurisdictional statutes other than diversity.
I therefore examine four jurisdictional scenarios in order to assess the role of the
twin aims in each: a federal court entertaining a federal cause of action, a state court
entertaining a federal cause of action (sometimes called reverse-Erie), and a federal
court entertaining a state law action under supplemental jurisdiction and under bankruptcy. In the course of my argument, I suggest a resolution to the current circuit split
about whether a federal court sitting in bankruptcy should use forum state choice-of-law
rules. I also argue that the Supreme Court has wrongly assumed that the twin aims
apply in a reverse-Erie context. As a result, it has improperly limited state courts’
powers when entertaining federal civil rights actions—most recently in Haywood v.
Drown, 556 U.S. 729 (2009).
 2013 Michael Steven Green. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may
reproduce and distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for
educational purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to
the Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Dudley W. Woodbridge Professor of Law, William & Mary Law School. I
would like to thank Pete Alces, Anthony Bellia, Lea Brilmayer, Kevin Clermont, John
Cross, Neal Devins, Scott Dodson, Abbe Gluck, Tara Grove, Nate Oman, Thomas
Plank, Richard Posner, Kim Roosevelt, Bill Van Alstyne, and Tobias Wolff for helpful
comments.
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This Article offers an original justification of the twin aims in diversity cases, and
the first comprehensive explanation of their role in a variety of other jurisdictional
contexts.

INTRODUCTION
In Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,1 Harry Tompkins, a Pennsylvania
citizen, sued the Erie Railroad Company, a New York citizen, in federal court in New York concerning an accident in Pennsylvania, in
which he was hit by something protruding from a passing train.2
Because Tompkins was trespassing at the time, an important issue was
Erie’s duty of care.3 Under Swift v. Tyson,4 the federal court could
have come to its own conclusion on the matter.5 But the Supreme
Court held that it had to answer the question by reference to Pennsylvania common law, as decided by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court.6
That much we learned in first-year civil procedure. But assume
that Tompkins had waited two and a half years before bringing suit,
and the issue had not been Erie’s duty of care, but whether
Tompkins’s action was time-barred. A New York state court would
apply its two-year statute of limitations and dismiss the action.
Tompkins claims, however, that the federal court should apply a more
flexible federal common law rule that looks to whether his delay was
unreasonable. How should the court rule?
We learned that one too. Under Guaranty Trust Co. v. York,7 the
federal court must apply New York’s statute of limitations.8 Since the
matter is not governed by a federal statute or a Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure, the court faces what Chief Justice Warren in Hanna v.
Plumer9 called a “typical, relatively unguided Erie choice.”10 That
means that the “twin aims of the Erie rule” govern.11 New York’s statute of limitations must be used to avoid “forum shopping” and the
“inequitable administration of the laws.”12
1 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
2 Id. at 69.
3 Id. at 70.
4 Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
5 Id. at 19.
6 Erie, 304 U.S. at 78–80.
7 Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
8 Id. at 110.
9 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965)
10 Id. at 471.
11 Id. at 468.
12 Id. York was decided before Hanna introduced the twin aims test for relatively
unguided cases. But it is clear that the decision in York would have been the same
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But that generates a puzzle. According to Erie, federal courts
must defer to state supreme courts concerning the content and scope
of state law. That means that New York’s statute of limitations applies
to Tompkins’s action only if the New York Court of Appeals says it
does. And the New York Court of Appeals might not care if its statute
of limitations is used by federal courts, even if the difference between
federal and New York procedure leads to forum shopping and litigant
inequity. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York looks more like Swift than Erie, for
in his opinion in York, Justice Frankfurter made no attempt to discern
the likely decision of the forum state’s supreme court. Indeed, York
looks even more Swiftian than Swift, which never suggested that federal courts could ignore state court interpretations of state statutes.13
This puzzle is not restricted to statutes of limitations. Relying on
the twin aims, federal courts sitting in diversity have applied forum
state law to a wide variety of issues, without considering the likely decision of the forum state’s supreme court. Some examples are: the tolling of statutes of limitations;14 preconditions for bringing suit (such as
posting a bond,15 filing a certificate of merit,16 and submitting the
dispute to arbitration17 or mediation18); the availability of attorney’s
fees if an offer of settlement is refused;19 hearings for a settlement
involving a minor;20 and methods of calculating attorney’s fees,21
exchange rates,22 and prejudgment interest.23 All of these decisions,
made in Erie’s name, in fact look threatened by Erie.
had the twin aims been used. See, e.g., Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740,
752–53 (1980); Graziano v. Pennell, 371 F.2d 761, 764 (2d Cir. 1967).
13 Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 19 (1842); see also Udell v. The Ohio, 24
F. Cas. 497, 497–98 (S.D.N.Y. 1851) (No. 14,321a) (“The local statutes will be
enforced in the United States courts in appropriate cases according to their effect in
the state where enacted, and consequently the expositions of the state tribunals are to
be received as the highest evidence of their design and import.”); Stewart Jay, Origins
of Federal Common Law: Part Two, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1231, 1265–66 (1985) (“[F]ederal
courts [are] obligated to follow state statutes regarding general law matters and ‘settled’ constructions given the statutes by the state courts.”).
14 Ragan v. Merchs. Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 533–34 (1949).
15 Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 555–57 (1949).
16 Chamberlain v. Giampapa, 210 F.3d 154, 161 (3d Cir. 2000).
17 Stoner v. Presbyterian Univ. Hosp., 609 F.2d 109, 110–11 (3d Cir. 1979); Edelson v. Soricelli, 610 F.2d 131, 134–35 (3d Cir. 1979).
18 Woods v. Holy Cross Hosp., 591 F.2d 1164, 1168–70 (5th Cir. 1979).
19 Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Tolliver, 636 F.3d 1273, 1280 (10th Cir. 2011).
20 Burke v. Smith, 252 F.3d 1260, 1265–66 (11th Cir. 2001).
21 Mangold v. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 67 F.3d 1470, 1478–79 (9th Cir. 1995).
22 Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 660 F.2d 854, 865–67 (2d Cir.
1981).
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Initially, some voices on the Court expressed concern that it was
violating its own command to respect state court decisions concerning
the scope of state law. For example, in Woods v. Interstate Realty Co.,24
the issue was whether a federal court sitting in diversity in Mississippi
should use a Mississippi statute requiring non-Mississippi corporations
to register to do business in Mississippi before bringing a lawsuit “in
any of the courts of this state.”25 The Fifth Circuit, after reviewing
Mississippi state court decisions, concluded that the phrase “courts of
this state” referred only to Mississippi state courts, not federal courts.26
But the Supreme Court held that the statute applied in federal court
anyway, prompting Justice Jackson, in his dissent, to observe that “we
seem to be doing the very thing we profess to avoid; that is, giving the
state law a different meaning in federal court than the state courts
have given it.”27
The twin aims are puzzling in other respects. We know that a
federal court in New York cannot create a common law limitations
period for Tompkins’s action because there would be forum shopping
and the inequitable administration of the laws. But a state court in
New Jersey or California is free to apply its own limitations period to
Tompkins’s action.28 Why isn’t the resulting forum shopping between
state courts impermissible? Why aren’t state courts inequitably
administering the laws? Furthermore, as the Supreme Court has
made clear, Congress could pass a statute of limitations that applied to
Tompkins’s action in federal court, even if forum shopping and litigant inequity might result.29 Why are federal courts bound by the
twin aims, but not Congress?
My goal in this Article is to offer a comprehensive explanation of
the twin aims that answers these puzzles. The heart of my argument is
that the twin aims are unrelated to the concerns about federalism and
state interests that motivated Erie. The twin aims are instead justified
by the federal interests standing behind the statute giving the federal
23 Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Walbrook Ins. Co., 41 F.3d 764, 773–74 (1st Cir.
1994).
24 Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949).
25 Id. at 536 n.1 (internal quotation marks omitted).
26 Interstate Realty Co. v. Woods, 168 F.2d 701, 704–05 (5th Cir. 1948), rev’d, 337
U.S. 535 (1949).
27 Woods, 337 U.S. at 539 (Jackson, J., dissenting); see also Peter Westen & Jeffrey
S. Lehman, Is There Life for Erie After the Death of Diversity?, 78 MICH. L. REV. 311,
357–58 (1980) (explaining Justice Jackson’s concerns with reference to the decision
in Woods).
28 See infra note 105.
29 See infra note 50.
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court jurisdiction. Although Warren spoke in Hanna of the “twin
aims of the Erie rule,” the twin aims are not about Erie.
By dissociating the twin aims from Erie and tying them to the
source of jurisdiction, I can explain why the federal courts in York and
Woods had to use the forum state’s legal rule, whether or not the
forum state’s supreme court wanted it to be used. The question was
not the applicability of state law, but whether the forum state’s rule
should be incorporated into federal common law to serve the federal
purposes standing behind the diversity statute.30
The incorporation of state law into federal common law is not
unusual. For example, when a federal statute lacks a limitations
period, federal courts will often borrow a limitations period from the
most analogous statute of limitations in the forum state.31 They do
this largely because of the feeling that it is awkward, and strangely
unjudicial,32 for a federal court to make up a limitations period out of
whole cloth. The Supreme Court has described the time limit applied
in such cases as federal, and it is easy to see why.33 The forum state’s
supreme court would not hold that its statute of limitations extends to
federal courts. The time limit is instead part of a federal common law
rule. It is for this reason that federal courts freely ignore state court
30 Westen and Lehman also argue that federal jurisdictional purposes recommend incorporating state law into federal common law. See Westen & Lehman, supra
note 27, at 373–74. But their argument reaches well beyond the twin aims to any
situation in which federal courts use state law. Id. at 356–59. That position has been
greeted with considerable hostility. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Continuing the Erie
Debate: A Response to Westen and Lehman, 78 MICH. L. REV. 959, 961 (1980) (criticizing
Westen’s and Lehman’s position on incorporation of state law into federal law). In
contrast, this Article provides a novel and detailed account of the federal purposes
standing behind the twin aims in particular. It also considers the twin aims’ role in a
variety of jurisdictional contexts not addressed by Westen and Lehman, including
bankruptcy and reverse-Erie.
For another suggestion that forum state law is incorporated into federal procedural common law in diversity cases, see Kermit Roosevelt III, Choice of Law in Federal
Courts: From Erie and Klaxon to CAFA and Shady Grove, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 15
(2012). Roosevelt too does not address the particular federal purposes standing
behind the twin aims, nor their role outside diversity.
31 See, e.g., UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 703–04 (1966). They
will generally do so unless the state limitations period will “frustrate or significantly
interfere with federal policies.” Reed v. United Transp. Union, 488 U.S. 319, 327
(1989).
32 Moviecolor Ltd. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 288 F.2d 80, 83 (2d Cir. 1961)
(Friendly, J.) (“[S]election of a period of years [is] not . . . the kind of thing judges
do . . . .”).
33 E.g., UAW, 383 U.S. at 706.
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interpretations of the borrowed statute of limitations, without anyone
thinking that Erie is violated.34
The same thing happens under the twin aims, except incorporation into federal common law extends far beyond limitations periods
to countless other aspects of state procedural law. Furthermore, the
motivations for incorporation are not primarily worries about pulling
rules out of thin air, but federal jurisdictional policies. The twin aims
are the means by which federal courts create federal procedural common law.35
This reading of the twin aims received some support about a decade ago in Justice Scalia’s opinion in Semtek International Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp.36 Semtek concerned the claim-preclusive effect of a
dismissal on statute of limitations grounds by a federal court sitting in
diversity in California.37 Scalia insisted that the preclusive effect of
the judgment of the federal court was governed by “federal common
law.”38 But, appealing to the twin aims, he nevertheless argued that
the federal court should adopt, “as the federally prescribed rule of
decision, the law that would be applied by state courts in the State in
which the federal diversity court sits.”39 Forum state standards should
be incorporated into federal common law. Scalia’s description, I will
argue, applies to all cases in which federal courts, relying on the twin
aims, apply the forum state’s legal rules.
One might think that the redescription of the twin aims as concerning incorporation rather than application of forum state law is
purely linguistic or, as it has sometimes been put, “metaphysical.”40
34 See, e.g., DelCostello v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 158–62 (1983);
Hemmings v. Barian, 822 F.2d 688, 690 (7th Cir. 1987).
35 For a discussion of the various types of federal procedural common law, see
Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure, Politics, and Power: The Role of Congress, 79 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1677, 1681 (2004). By federal procedural common law, I mean here law created by federal courts decisionally (rather than through prospective court rules). I
also mean law that can always be overridden by federal statutes. For examples of the
substantial literature on the possibility of federal courts’ having powers over procedure in defiance of Congress, see Amy Coney Barrett, Procedural Common Law, 94 VA.
L. REV. 813 (2008); Linda S. Mullenix, Unconstitutional Rulemaking: The Civil Justice
Reform Act and Separation of Powers, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1283 (1993); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr.,
The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts and the Structural Constitution, 86 IOWA L. REV. 735
(2001).
36 Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497 (2001).
37 Id. at 497.
38 Id. at 508.
39 Id.
40 Redish, supra note 30, at 961.
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But it actually makes a very big practical difference to how relatively
unguided cases are decided.41
I begin my argument by outlining the role that the twin aims play
in relatively unguided cases, and distinguishing them from the constitutional principle expressed in Erie.42 Erie concerns federalism and
respect for state interests. In contrast, the twin aims are concerned
about uniformity with forum state courts, whether or not the forum
state, or any other state, wants such a result. Distinguishing between
the twin aims and state interests is essential to resolving relatively
unguided cases adequately.
I then offer my justification of the twin aims.43 Because the twin
aims are not about protecting state interests, they cannot be justified
by the federalism concerns central to Erie. Nor can they be justified by
the Rules of Decision Act, to which John Hart Ely and occasionally the
Supreme Court have pointed as their source.44 The true reason the
twin aims apply in diversity cases is the diversity statute. In giving federal courts jurisdiction over diversity cases, Congress sought to create
an alternative forum in each state that is free from bias against nondomiciliaries. It follows from this goal that federal courts should borrow the procedural rules that would be used by a forum state court, to
ensure that decisions by the parties about whether to seek a federal
forum are not influenced by considerations unrelated to worries
about bias. The first of the twin aims (discouraging forum shopping)
follows from the purpose of diversity (protecting against state court
bias).
In the course of this argument, I solve a number of other outstanding puzzles about the twin aims, including why Warren mentions
the inequitable administration of the laws as a second aim separate
from forum shopping; why horizontal differences in procedure
between state court systems do not violate the twin aims; and why federal courts, but not Congress, are bound by the twin aims. I am also
able to answer a question no one has ever thought to ask—why the
duty of ensuring procedural uniformity in diversity cases does not rest
upon state courts.
But my reading does not merely make puzzles disappear. It also
forces us to face problems about the role of the twin aims outside of
diversity that have been ignored or suppressed in the past. If the twin
aims have their source, not in Erie, but in the purposes standing
41
42
43
44

See
See
See
See

infra
infra
infra
infra

Part
Part
Part
Part

I.B–C.
I.
II.
II.A.
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behind the congressional grant of jurisdiction, the fact that a court
entertains a state law action is neither a necessary nor a sufficient reason for the twin aims to apply. The twin aims might apply to federal
courts when entertaining federal causes of action. Conversely, they
might not apply to a federal court when entertaining state law actions
under jurisdictional statutes other than diversity. I therefore consider
four possible jurisdictional scenarios in order to assess the role of the
twin aims in each: a federal court entertaining a federal cause of
action, a state court entertaining a federal cause of action (sometimes
called reverse-Erie), and a federal court entertaining a state law action
under supplemental jurisdiction and under bankruptcy.
To a large extent, my analysis supports current doctrine. I conclude that the twin aims do not apply to federal courts entertaining
federal causes of action and that they apply to a federal court entertaining a state law action in supplemental jurisdiction.45 But this is
not because the twin aims are about respect for state lawmaking
power. It is because of the purposes for which Congress created federal jurisdiction in each case.
In some areas, however, I recommend that current doctrine be
revised. For example, I argue that the twin aims do not apply in
reverse-Erie cases, contrary to what a majority on the Supreme Court
has suggested. State courts’ power over procedure when entertaining
federal causes of action—including actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983—
has been unduly restricted by the Court, most recently in Haywood v.
Drown.46 I also conclude that the twin aims have an unusual and limited effect in bankruptcy cases, and I use this conclusion to offer a
solution to the current circuit split about whether a federal court sitting in bankruptcy should use forum state choice-of-law rules.47
To repeat, the goal of this Article is to explain the twin aims, by
distinguishing them from the respect for state interests demanded by
Erie. But the twin aims are only one consideration when deciding relatively unguided Erie cases. In particular, I take no stand here on the
role that state interests and Erie itself might play in such cases, a matter about which the Supreme Court, surprisingly, has given federal
courts little guidance.
Consider the limitations period that our federal court in New
York should use for Tompkins’s action. Under my reading, the twin
aims recommend that it apply a federal common law time limit that
incorporates New York law. The time limit is federal, because its use is
45 See infra Parts III.A.1, B.1.
46 Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729 (2009). See infra Part III.A.2.
47 See infra Part III.B.2.
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justified by the federal purposes standing behind the diversity statute.
But couldn’t the time limit also be described as New York law, if the
New York Court of Appeals wants it to be used in federal court? Can’t
state interests—and so Erie—play a role in relatively unguided cases? I
close the Article by describing briefly the course that future research
on these matters should take.
I. “RELATIVELY UNGUIDED” ERIE CASES
In this Part, I will spell out current law on how federal courts
should deal with relatively unguided Erie cases, emphasizing the different roles played by the twin aims and Erie.
A. Identifying Relatively Unguided Cases
In Hanna v. Plumer, the Supreme Court held that an issue faced
by a federal court can be relatively unguided, and so subject to the
twin aims, only if it is not governed by valid federal enacted law—that
is, by a federal statute or a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure.48 Congress’s power to establish (and, if it wishes, to disestablish) the lower
federal court system—augmented by the Necessary and Proper
Clause—gives it the power “to regulate matters which, though falling
within the uncertain area between substance and procedure, are
rationally capable of classification as either.”49 However this “arguably
procedural” standard should be understood, it does not include the
twin aims. Congress has the power to regulate the procedure of federal courts even if the differences between federal and forum state
procedure are substantial and so generate vertical forum shopping.
Indeed, it has often been noted that Congress could use its power
over federal procedure to pass a uniform limitations period for state
law actions brought in federal court, which Guaranty Trust Co. v. York
held federal courts could not do through federal procedural common
law.50
Congress delegated much of its power to regulate the procedure
of federal district courts to the Supreme Court in the Rules Enabling
48 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 473–74 (1965). Of course, the twin aims also
do not apply if the matter is governed by the United States Constitution.
49 Id. at 472; see also Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 32 (1988)
(reasserting this congressional authority).
50 See Paul D. Carrington, “Substance” and “Procedure” in the Rules Enabling Act,
1989 DUKE L.J. 281, 294; Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Not Bad for Government Work: Does Anyone Else Think the Supreme Court Is Doing a Halfway Decent Job in Its Erie-Hanna Jurisprudence?, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 963, 973 (1998); Patrick Woolley, Erie and Choice of
Law After the Class Action Fairness Act, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1723, 1768 (2006).
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Act, which authorized the Supreme Court to “prescribe general rules
of practice and procedure” for such courts.51 Here too the restrictions that Congress put on the Supreme Court’s power do not appear
to include the twin aims.52
The most important restriction is that Federal Rules “shall not
abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.”53 This seems to
withhold congressional power from the Supreme Court, since Congress probably could—in exercise of its power to regulate the arguably
procedural—abridge, enlarge, or modify substantive rights. Although
the scope of the substantive right limitation remains something of a
mystery,54 what is important for our purposes is that it does not
appear to take into account the twin aims. The difference between
the standard in a Federal Rule and the procedural law used by a
forum state court might generate vertical forum shopping without the
validity of the Federal Rule being implicated.55
B. Deciding Relatively Unguided Cases
Let us assume, therefore, that an issue faced by a federal court
sitting in diversity is not governed by federal enacted law. If so, the
court faces a relatively unguided Erie choice and the twin aims govern.
As Chief Justice Warren put the matter in Hanna, the federal court
has a reason to use the rules that would be used by a forum state court
if that is needed to avoid “forum shopping” and “the inequitable
administration of the laws.”56
1. The Twin Aims
As Warren made clear in Hanna, the forum shopping test is
answered by considering whether the difference between federal and
forum state standards would, ex ante, influence the plaintiff’s choice to
bring the action in federal or state court (or the defendant’s choice to
remove to federal court). Thus, minor differences in service rules,
although outcome determinative if the applicable rule is not abided
51 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2006).
52 This does not mean that ambiguous Federal Rules should not be read to avoid
frustrating the twin aims. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
130 S. Ct. 1431, 1441 n.7 (2010).
53 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b).
54 Compare Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1442–43 (majority opinion), with id. at
1448–50 (Stevens, J., concurring) (illustrating different conceptions of the
limitation).
55 Id. at 1447–48 (majority opinion); id. at 1448 (Stevens, J., concurring).
56 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965).
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by,57 do not implicate the twin aims, because these differences would
not generally be relevant to a decision by the parties about where the
suit should proceed.58 On the other hand, differences between limitations periods would motivate forum shopping. For this reason, federal courts should use the limitations period that would be used by a
forum state court.59 Concerns about vertical forum shopping have
motivated federal courts to borrow a substantial amount of forum
state procedural law.60
Federal courts have had more difficulty figuring out how to
employ the “inequitable administration of the laws” test. It seems reasonably clear that the question is not whether a state or federal standard is, considered on its own, inequitable. The idea is instead that
inequity is generated by substantially different rules applying to a state
law action solely by virtue of “the accident of diversity of citizenship.”61
For example, if federal courts created a short common law time
limit for diversity actions, the defendant in a non-diversity action
could argue that she was being treated inequitably by being denied
the advantage of the shorter time limit. Or, if a diversity action were
removed to federal court by the defendant and dismissed as timebarred, the plaintiff could argue that he was being treated inequitably
by being submitted to a rule that would not have been used in the
forum state court. The Supreme Court has failed to provide a clear
theory, however, about what the relevant inequity is. It is not surprising, therefore, that federal courts tend to focus on forum shopping
and throw in inequity as an afterthought.62
57 The Court initially offered an outcome-determinative test in Guar. Trust Co. v.
York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945).
58 Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468–69 (“[T]he difference between the two rules would be
of scant, if any, relevance to the choice of a forum.”).
59 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
60 See supra notes 14–23 and accompanying text. Two recent examples are Liggon-Redding v. Estate of Sugarman, 659 F.3d 258 (3d Cir. 2011) (borrowing state rule
requiring certificate of merit before filing malpractice action) and Scottsdale Ins. Co. v.
Tolliver, 636 F.3d 1273 (10th Cir. 2011) (borrowing state rule allowing defendant to
collect attorney’s fees if defendant prevails after offer of judgment is refused).
61 Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941).
62 See Richard D. Freer, Some Thoughts on the State of Erie After Gasperini, 76 TEX.
L. REV. 1637, 1652 (1998). But see Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 753
(1980) (claiming that inequity but not forum shopping test was violated because
actual parties in case did not engage in forum shopping). For the persuasive argument that the forum shopping test should look beyond the actual parties’ decisions,
see Patrick Woolley, The Sources of Federal Preclusion Law After Semtek, 72 U. CIN. L.
REV. 527, 548–49 (2003).
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2. Countervailing Federal Interests
If the twin aims are not implicated, a federal court is free to use a
uniform federal procedural common law rule.63 For example,
because differences in service standards do not frustrate the twin aims,
a federal court may come up with an independent rule on the matter,
provided it is not already regulated by federal enacted law. But it does
not follow that if the twin aims are frustrated by a uniform federal
rule, a federal court must borrow a rule from the forum state’s courts.
In Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, the Supreme Court concluded that federal courts should also consider “countervailing” federal interests in favor of a uniform federal rule.64
Byrd concerned whether a federal court in South Carolina entertaining a negligence action under South Carolina law should use a
South Carolina rule that gave to the judge the power to decide the
factual question of whether the plaintiff was covered by South Carolina’s worker’s compensation statute. Under the alternative federal
rule, the matter would be decided by the jury. The Supreme Court
held that the federal court should use the federal rule, because “the
federal policy favoring jury decisions of disputed fact questions” overrode any need for vertical uniformity.65
In the past there was some doubt about the continued viability of
Byrd’s appeal to countervailing federal interests, since they were not
mentioned in Hanna. In Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, however,
the Court once again mentioned Byrd and countervailing federal
interests as relevant—with the twin aims—in deciding relatively
unguided cases.66 Furthermore, the Court also mentioned countervailing federal interests (although not Byrd by name) in Semtek.67 And
countervailing federal interests have frequently been relied upon by
the lower federal courts.68
3.

Byrd’s Bound-up Test

Byrd introduced yet another consideration that comes into play in
relatively unguided cases. Before addressing questions of vertical uni63 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 5.3.5, at 316 (4th ed. 2003). This
assumes, of course, that state interests do not recommend that state law be used in
federal court. See infra Part I.B.3.
64 Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958).
65 Id. at 538.
66 Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 431–32 (1996).
67 Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 508–09 (2001).
68 E.g., Esfeld v. Costa Crociere, 289 F.3d 1300, 1307 (11th Cir. 2002); Moling v.
O’Reilly Auto., Inc., 763 F. Supp. 2d 956, 975–76 (W.D. Tenn. 2011).
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formity and countervailing federal interests, Justice Brennan noted
that a threshold question was whether South Carolina’s rule was a part
of the cause of action upon which the plaintiff sued. If it was, he
argued, the federal court would be constitutionally obligated to apply
the South Carolina rule. Erie puts a duty on federal courts sitting in
diversity to “respect the definition of state-created rights and obligations by the state courts,” including state law rules “bound up with
these rights and obligations.”69 Only when this duty is satisfied would
the “policy” in favor of uniformity with the forum state (subsequently
described in Hanna as the twin aims), as well as countervailing federal
interests, come into play.70
To see why something like the Byrd test is necessary, consider the
question addressed in Erie, namely whether a federal court in New
York sitting in diversity could come to its own conclusion about the
common law in Pennsylvania. Erie held, of course, that it could not.
It had to use Pennsylvania common law as decided by Pennsylvania
state courts. Without the Byrd test, the justification for this conclusion
would have to be that if a federal court used its own judgment, there
would be inequity and forum shopping between federal and state
court in New York.
But this is absurd, for it leaves the federal court’s duty to Pennsylvania out of the equation. It is true that in his opinion Justice Brandeis criticized the vertical forum shopping and inequity generated by
the regime of Swift v. Tyson,71 in which federal courts were allowed to
come to their own conclusions about the content of the general common law.72 But his argument against Swift was primarily based upon
constitutional considerations about respect for state lawmaking
power.73 Although the details, as well as the success, of this constitutional argument are matters of considerable debate,74 the heart of the
argument was that the principles of federalism embodied in the Constitution did not give the federal court in Erie the authority to create a

69 Byrd, 356 U.S. at 535.
70 Id. at 536.
71 Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
72 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1938).
73 Id. at 78.
74 For my reading of the constitutional sources of the decision in Erie, see
Michael Steven Green, Horizontal Erie and the Presumption of Forum Law, 109 MICH. L.
REV. 1237, 1241–51 (2011) [hereinafter Green, Presumption] and Michael Steven
Green, Erie’s Suppressed Premise, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1111, 1115–61 (2011) [hereinafter
Green, Suppressed].
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body of general common law.75 It was bound to respect Pennsylvania’s lawmaking authority.76
To be sure, federal courts have some power to create federal
common law.77 But given that Brandeis could not have been unaware
of this fact,78 he must have meant that federal courts do not have common lawmaking power solely by virtue of having diversity jurisdiction.79 Cases in which they create common law rules that displace
state law can be squared with the constitutional argument in Erie,
75 See Erie, 304 U.S. at 78 (“[N]o clause in the Constitution purports to confer . . .
a power [to create federal general common law] upon the federal courts.”); see also
Stephen B. Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, Full Faith and Credit and Federal Common Law: A General Approach, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 733, 756 n.102 (1986) (acknowledging the absence of such authority); John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87
HARV. L. REV. 693, 702–03 (1974) (same).
76 For many, Erie and the Rules of Decision Act articulate separation-of-powers
and not just federalism restrictions on federal courts’ common law powers. See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997) (describing
the limiting effect Erie and the Rules of Decision Act put on federal courts’ common
lawmaking power concerning customary international law); Curtis A. Bradley et al.,
Sosa, Customary International Law, and the Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120 HARV. L.
REV. 869, 878–81 (2007) (describing Erie as a separation-of-powers limit on federal
courts’ ability to create federal common law); Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers
as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321 (2001) (arguing that Erie’s limitation
on federal courts’ powers to create common law illustrates how separation of powers
protects federalism); Martin H. Redish, Federal Common Law, Political Legitimacy, and
the Interpretive Process: An “Institutionalist” Perspective, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 761 (1989)
(arguing that the Rules of Decision Act prohibits federal common law in the absence
of a statutory directive). As a result, a new Erie doctrine, concerning separation of
powers rather than federalism, has emerged. For a criticism of this new Erie doctrine,
see Craig Green, Repressing Erie’s Myth, 96 CAL. L. REV. 595, 615–55 (2008); Louise
Weinberg, The Curious Notion that the Rules of Decision Act Blocks Supreme Federal Common
Law, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 860, 861–69 (1989). For the purposes of this Article, the term
“Erie” will be reserved for the federalism constraints on federal courts that were the
focus of Brandeis’s opinion.
77 E.g., Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 512 (1988) (recognizing limited federal common law immunity from state tort liability for injuries for defective
products created by government contractors); Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry
Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938) (describing apportionment of water from
the La Plata River between Colorado and New Mexico as “a question of ‘federal common law’ upon which neither the statutes nor the decisions of either State can be
conclusive”). See generally Jay Tidmarsh & Brian J. Murray, A Theory of Federal Common
Law, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 585, 620–27 (2006) (describing the different enclaves in
which federal common law may be made).
78 Brandeis was, after all, the author of Hinderlider, 304 U.S. 92. See supra note 77.
79 See United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 591 (1973); Ely,
supra note 75, at 713; Martha A. Field, The Legitimacy of Federal Common Law, 12 PACE
L. REV. 303, 306 (1992).
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since it is a sufficiently strong “federal interest,”80 not diversity jurisdiction, that justifies the federal common law rule.81 In Erie, no federal
interest was asserted and thus Pennsylvania common law, as decided
by Pennsylvania state courts, had to be used.
To repeat, the federal court in Erie could not come to its own
conclusion about Pennsylvania law because doing so would violate its
duty to respect Pennsylvania’s interests—not because of the twin aims,
that is, because it would generate litigant inequity and vertical forum
shopping between federal and state courts in New York. Indeed, it is
not clear that deference to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would
have satisfied the twin aims. Pre-Erie, many state courts were committed to Swift v. Tyson too.82 When entertaining common law actions
arising in sister states they would, like federal courts, come to their
own judgments about what the relevant common law rule was. To the
extent that a New York state court ignored the decisions of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, imposing an Erie obligation on a federal
court in New York to respect Pennsylvania decisions would increase vertical forum shopping, not decrease it.83
The fact that Justice Brandeis insisted on deference to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, without even asking what New York state
courts would do, shows that his focus was not vertical uniformity. He
was concerned about federalism—that is, showing respect for the regulatory authority of the state whose law he thought governed the matter.84 The Byrd test is intended to capture this role that state
interests—and so Erie—play when a federal court sits in diversity.
Since Erie’s duty of care was bound up with the Pennsylvania right
upon which Tompkins sued, the federal court was constitutionally
bound to respect Pennsylvania law. The twin aims and countervailing
federal interests were irrelevant.
As I read it, a state’s rule is bound up with the state’s cause of
action if state authorities would say that the rule follows the cause of
action into other court systems. This interpretation is suggested by a
case cited by Brennan as an example of the Byrd test being satisfied:
80 See Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 509 (2001).
81 See Adam N. Steinman, What is the Erie Doctrine? (And What Does It Mean for the
Contemporary Politics of Judicial Federalism?), 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 245, 316–20
(2008).
82 Green, Suppressed, supra note 74, at 1121–27. Indeed Georgia still holds such a
view. Id. at 1126–27.
83 Green, Presumption, supra note 74, at 1279–80.
84 Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L.
REV. 489, 513 (1954) (describing forum shopping as “a relatively minor consideration
which Brandeis mentioned only in passing”).
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Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dunlap.85 Dunlap held that a federal court in
Texas adjudicating a boundary dispute concerning land in Texas was
obligated to use a Texas rule putting the burden of proof on the one
attacking legal title. In horizontal choice of law, it is common for a
state court entertaining a cause of action under sister state law to use
the sister state’s rule concerning the burden of proof, on the ground
that the sister state’s authorities would want the rule to follow the sister state’s causes of action into other court systems.86 In holding that
Texas’s rule on the burden of proof was a “substantial right upon
which the holder of recorded legal title to Texas land may confidently
rely,”87 the Dunlap Court appeared to conclude that Texas authorities—in particular, the Texas Supreme Court—would say that the rule
should be used in federal court.
85 Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U.S. 208 (1939) (cited in Byrd v. Blue Ridge
Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 535 (1958)). Although the Byrd test, as I understand it,
is tied to the likely decisions of the relevant state’s supreme court, figuring out what
this decision would be is exceptionally difficult. See Michael Steven Green, Law’s Dark
Matter, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 845, 869–84 (2013). For example, Dunlap cited no
case in which the Texas Supreme Court, or any other Texas state court, said that
Texas’s rule on the burden of proof should follow Texas actions into other court
systems. The reason is that (absent certification) no Texas state court would have an
occasion to opine about whether a federal or sister state court should use the Texas
rule. Texas state courts are concerned solely with the rules that they should use. The
question of whether other courts should use the rule would be faced only by those
other courts when entertaining an action concerning Texas property.
Indeed, with one exception, the courts of a sovereign that creates a rule concerning the burden of proof will never have the occasion, absent certification, to say
whether the rule satisfies the Byrd test. Significantly, the one exception was in fact
cited in Dunlap. This was Cent. Vt. Ry. Co. v. White, 238 U.S. 507, 512 (1915) in which
the Supreme Court, taking a FELA case on appeal from the Vermont state court system, held that the federal rule (under which the burden of proving contributory negligence was on the defendant) was intended by Congress to follow FELA actions into
state courts. See Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239, 243 (1942) (holding
that the federal rule concerning burden of proof should be used in a Jones Act action
in state court). Reverse-Erie cases—that is, cases in which a state court entertains an
action under federal law—are significant because the United States Supreme Court
can take the case on appeal from the state court system. In contrast, a state supreme
court cannot take an issue about its law on appeal from federal courts or from the
courts of sister states. It can get the issue only through certification. Thus only in
reverse-Erie cases do we have regular statements by a sovereign’s courts about which of
its rules are bound up with a cause of action. But see infra Part III.A.2 (arguing that in
many reverse-Erie cases in which the Supreme Court holds that a federal rule should
be used by a state court, the real reason is not that the federal rule is bound up with
the federal cause of action, but the twin aims).
86 See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 595 (1934); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 133, cmt. b (1969).
87 Dunlap, 308 U.S. at 212.
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In short, state interests clearly can play an important role in relatively unguided Erie cases. As we shall see, however, there are good
reasons to question whether the Byrd test accurately captures this
role.88 Although it is not my goal in this Article to spell out state interests’ correct role in detail, I will end the Article with a brief discussion
of the course that research on the matter should take.
C. Distinguishing the Twin Aims from State Interests
To repeat, this Article will not address how a federal court should
resolve a relatively unguided Erie case when a state supreme court
would say that it wants its rule to extend to federal court, such that we
could describe the federal court as actually applying, rather than borrowing, state law. My point is that the twin aims are about borrowing
state law, not applying it.
Borrowing and applying state law can easily be confused, particularly when a plaintiff sues in federal court under forum state law. Part
of the problem is the way that federal courts use the terms “substantive” and “procedural” in relatively unguided Erie cases. It is commonly said, for example, that federal courts sitting in diversity must
apply federal procedural law and state substantive law89—and that
statutes of limitations are substantive for Erie purposes.90 Such statements suggest that a federal court sitting in diversity must use a state’s
statute of limitations due to the Byrd test—that is, because the state’s
officials want the rule to apply. Judge Posner suggests this in Hemmings v. Barian91:
When a federal court borrows a state statute of limitations for use in
connection with a federal statute that does not have its own statute
of limitations, the court is not applying state law; it is applying federal law. It looks to state law for guidance . . . .
. . . .The analysis would, however, be different if [we were sitting in]
diversity rather than federal-question . . . . For purposes of the Erie
doctrine, the statute of limitations is substantive rather than procedural, and the federal court therefore applies state law—it doesn’t
just borrow it [citing Guaranty Trust Co. v. York].92
88 See infra Conclusion.
89 E.g., Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996); Windy
City Metal Fabricators & Supply, Inc. v. CIT Tech. Fin. Servs., Inc., 536 F.3d 663, 670
(7th Cir. 2008).
90 E.g., Jinks v. Richland Cnty., 538 U.S. 456, 465 (2003); Hollander v. Brown, 457
F.3d 688, 692 (7th Cir. 2006); Phelps v. McClellan, 30 F.3d 658, 661 (6th Cir. 1994).
91 Hemmings v. Barian, 822 F.2d 688 (7th Cir. 1987).
92 Id. at 689–90 (citing Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945)).
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This cannot be right, however, for state law can govern of its own
force in federal court only if the relevant state supreme court wants it
to. The Supreme Court did not hold in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York that
New York’s limitations period should be used because the New York
Court of Appeals would want such a result. The respect for state lawmaking power standing at the heart of the Erie doctrine was absent.
New York’s limitations period was used in York because of federal interests subsequently described in Hanna as the twin aims. For all the
Court in York knew, the New York Court of Appeals was happy to have
federal procedural law govern the limitations periods for New York
actions brought in federal court. Thus, although federal courts
describe statutes of limitations as substantive for Erie purposes, in York
it was actually a federal, not a state, limitations period that was
applied.
Although this distinction might seem metaphysical,93 Posner’s
failure to attend to it has had serious distorting effects on his treatment of relatively unguided Erie cases. An example is his opinion in
Harbor Insurance Co. v. Continental Bank Corp.,94 which concerned an
Illinois breach of contract action before a federal court in Illinois.95
One issue that arose in the case was whether the federal court should
use Illinois’s doctrine of “mend the hold,” which prevents the defendant in a breach of contract action from changing his position during
the course of his dispute with the other party to the contract.96
In answering the question, Posner looked solely to state interests,
without considering the twin aims.97 He argued, for example, that
Illinois law should be used, because the doctrine is “a corollary of the
duty of good faith that the law of Illinois . . . imposes on the parties to
contracts.”98 He also asked whether it has been treated by state courts
as “a pure principle of procedure” or “as a substantive doctrine”—
which would appear to concern whether state authorities think the
doctrine should be applied only by their own courts or should follow

93 Redish, supra note 30, at 961.
94 Harbor Ins. Co. v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 922 F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1990).
95 Id. at 359.
96 Id. at 362. Ultimately, Posner concluded that the factual record did not allow a
determination of whether the doctrine applied. Id. at 365.
97 Posner appeared to conclude that federal enacted law—especially FED. R. CIV.
P. 8(e)(2)—was not dispositive on the matter. Id. at 364. For a concurring view, see
Robert H. Sitkoff, “Mend the Hold” and Erie: Why an Obscure Contracts Doctrine Should
Control in Federal Diversity Cases, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1059, 1080–84 (1998).
98 Harbor Ins. Co., 922 F.2d at 363.
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their contract actions into other court systems.99 He concluded that it
was substantive.
As a statement of Illinois law, this is very likely wrong. Illinois
state courts have applied the doctrine of mend the hold when entertaining contract actions under sister state law,100 which suggests that
they do not consider the doctrine to be bound up with Illinois contract actions.101 But my primary objection to Posner’s opinion in Harbor Insurance is not that he was wrong about Illinois’s interests, but that
he focused exclusively on such interests, without considering the twin
aims. Granted, his error ended up being harmless: even though he
ignored the twin aims, he concluded, on the basis of Illinois interests
alone, that Illinois’s doctrine should be used. But what if he had concluded—as is probably the case—that Illinois was not interested in its
doctrine applying in other court systems? According to his reasoning,
it would follow that the doctrine should not have been used by a federal court in Illinois, despite the fact that the twin aims would recommend otherwise.102 The failure of a federal court in Illinois to use the
doctrine would cause forum shopping and the inequitable administration of the laws.103
Indeed, it is precisely because the twin aims differ from state
interests that Justice Frankfurter was at pains to argue in Guaranty
Trust Co. v. York that the characterization of New York’s statute of limitations as substantive or procedural for choice-of-law purposes was
irrelevant to the question faced by the Court.104 It did not matter that
New York did not want its limitations period to be used in federal
court. It should be used anyway.
Because the twin aims are not focused on state interests, they can
frustrate such interests. Consider the following scenario: Tompkins
sues Erie under Pennsylvania negligence law in federal court in New
York. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that Pennsylvania’s
two-year limitations period is bound up with Pennsylvania negligence
actions and so follows them into other court systems. The New York
99 Id.
100 United Farm Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Frye, 887 N.E.2d 783 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008).
101 It is conceivable, however, that the doctrine is meant to be used by Illinois
courts (including when entertaining contract actions under the law of other jurisdictions) and to follow Illinois contract actions into other court system. None of the
cases Posner cited actually addresses the matter directly of course, for no state court
has a reason to say whether one of its rules follows its causes of action into other court
systems. As I put it in Green, supra note 85, the question is about “dark matter.”
102 Sitkoff, supra note 97, at 1084–89.
103 For another criticism of Posner as examining a case solely in the light of Erie,
without considering the twin aims, see Green, Presumption, supra note 74, at 1278–79.
104 Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108–09 (1945).

R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-4\NDL403.txt

1884

unknown

Seq: 20

notre dame law review

22-MAY-13

9:22

[vol. 88:4

Court of Appeals has held, however, that New York state courts should
apply New York’s three-year limitations period to Pennsylvania negligence actions, despite the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision.105
But the New York Court of Appeals has also held that its three-year
period does not extend to federal courts in New York. In such a scenario, the twin aims would make a choice that is directly contrary to
state interests. The federal court should use New York’s three-year
period even though Pennsylvania wants its two-year period to be used
and New York does not care whether its three-year period is used.
The ability of the twin aims to frustrate state interests is evident in
another Posner case on mend the hold, Level 3 Communications, Inc. v.
Federal Insurance Co.106 This case concerned a Nebraska contract
action brought in federal court in Illinois.107 When discussing the
applicability of mend the hold Posner cited Nebraska cases—
undoubtedly assuming that Nebraska law on the matter applied, since
the plaintiff sued under Nebraska contract law. This is a mistake.
Because Illinois courts would apply Illinois’s doctrine to contract
actions under sister state law,108 the twin aims would demand that Illinois’s approach be borrowed by a federal court in Illinois, even if
Nebraska wants its views on the matter to be used by the federal court

105 The Supreme Court has not determined whether a forum state may prefer its
longer procedural statute of limitations over an applicable sister state limitations
period. The closest it has come is Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717 (1988). But
Sun Oil told us only that the court had the power to apply its statute of limitations in
the absence of competing sister state law, for in his opinion in Sun Oil Justice Scalia
noted that the sister states at issue did not want their statutes of limitations to follow
their causes of action into other court systems. Id. at 729 n.3. The Supreme Court
has held that a state court may prefer its shorter procedural statute of limitations over
a sister state’s applicable limitations period. Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S.
514, 517–18 (1953). In this scenario, however, the dismissal usually allows the plaintiff to sue again in another forum. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 19(f)
(1982); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 110 cmt. b (1969). It is arguable, therefore, that the application of the forum’s procedural law does not really conflict with sister state law. See RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 9.2B (6th ed. 2010).
106 Level 3 Commc’ns, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 168 F.3d 956 (7th Cir. 1998).
107 Id. at 956–57.
108 In United Farm Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Frye, 887 N.E.2d 783 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008),
an Illinois state court applied Illinois’s doctrine of mend the hold to a contract action
under Indiana law. Id. at 787–88. The court did not consider Indiana law. Id. This
suggests that it thought Indiana law should always yield to Illinois law on the matter.
It is conceivable, however, that the court would have held that Illinois’s doctrine
should yield to a contrary Indiana law if it had been shown that Indiana officials
wanted their law to follow Indiana contract actions into other court systems.
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and Illinois itself has no interest in its doctrine applying outside its
own court system.109
Another situation in which the twin aims can frustrate state interests is when a federal court is forced to choose between the applicable
laws of two or more states. Consider a case in which two states have
the power to regulate the matter faced by the federal court and both
have chosen to exercise their power. An example would be if both
Pennsylvania and New York had chosen to regulate Erie’s duty of care
through different legal rules. New York, let us assume, wanted to regulate the matter because Erie was a New York domiciliary.110 Pennsylvania wanted to regulate the matter not merely because Tompkins
was domiciled in the state but also for the more significant reason that
the negligent conduct and the resulting accident occurred in
Pennsylvania.
The only duty Erie would put on the federal court in such a situation is to not diverge from the law of every state with lawmaking power.
It could not ignore what both Pennsylvania and New York courts say
about Erie’s duty of care.111 But Erie could not help the federal court
choose between the two states’ laws. It would have to use a choice-oflaw rule to resolve the conflict. And since the matter is not covered by
federal enacted law, the choice-of-law rule would be federal common
law.
In coming up with this rule, the twin aims recommend that the
federal court borrow the rule that would be used by New York state
courts.112 If a New York state court would apply New York law, a fed109 Again, Posner’s mistake caused no harm in the particular case, for Illinois and
Nebraska law appeared to be the same on the matter.
110 In fact, it is unlikely that Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981) would
have been satisfied by the application of New York law to Erie’s duty of care. Under
Allstate, to satisfy the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Full
Faith and Credit Clause, a forum state needs “significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests,” such that “choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.” Id. at 308. I set aside such worries here.
111 For a further discussion, see Green, Presumption, supra note 74, at 1274–80.
112 For a very different view of Klaxon, see Roosevelt, supra note 30, at 16–23. As
Roosevelt sees it, state courts sometimes understand their choice-of-law rules as territorial limits on the scope of their causes of action that follow those causes of action
into federal and sister state court. A federal and sister state court cannot apply Pennsylvania’s law to certain facts unless the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, when deciding
the matter for lower Pennsylvania state courts, would hold that Pennsylvania law
applies. Klaxon, in turn, expresses federal courts’ constitutional obligation under Erie
to respect state interests by following a state’s choice-of-law rules when determining
the territorial scope of the state’s law. For a similar view of state choice-of-law rules,
see Lea Brilmayer, Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws: A Challenge, 35 MERCER
L. REV. 555, 563 (1984); Larry Kramer, Return of the Renvoi, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 979,
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eral court in New York should too, unless substantial countervailing
federal interests recommend otherwise. After all, if it used a uniform
federal choice-of-law rule, parties would vertically forum shop to get
the state law they wanted. As the Supreme Court put it in Klaxon Co.
v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co., a uniform federal choice-of-law
rule would “constantly disturb equal administration of justice in coordinate state and federal courts sitting side by side.”113
Notice that New York’s choice-of-law rule does not actually apply
in federal court. It is instead incorporated into a federal choice-of-law
rule in order to satisfy the twin aims. To be sure, it is conceivable that
if the matter were certified to the New York Court of Appeals, it would
say that it wants its choice-of-law rule to be used by federal and sister
state courts, in the sense that it wants them to apply New York rather
than Pennsylvania law to the facts too.114 But it is equally conceivable
that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would say that it wants federal
and sister state courts to use its choice-of-law rule, in the sense that it
wants them to apply Pennsylvania rather than New York law to the
facts. Even if New York’s choice-of-law rule is understood as, in some
sense, bound up with New York causes of action, the federal court still
faces a conflict between New York and Pennsylvania law, which it cannot answer on the basis of the laws of those states themselves. The
matter must be decided according to a federal common law rule. The
question is solely what the content of that rule will be.
Due to Klaxon, the federal court would be required to apply New
York law if that is what a New York state court would do, even though
New York appears to be favoring its minor interests over Penn986–87 (1991); Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 303
(1990); Kermit Roosevelt III, Resolving Renvoi: The Bewitchment of Our Intelligence by
Means of Language, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1821, 1840–41, 1863–64, 1889–90 (2005).
For a similar but less plausible conception of Klaxon than Roosevelt’s, see infra note
275.
I criticize the Brilmayer-Kramer-Roosevelt approach at Green, supra note 85, at
871–84; Michael Steven Green, Choice of Law as General Common Law: A Reply to Professor Brilmayer, in THE ROLE OF ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 125 (Donald Earl Childress III ed., 2011). It is unlikely that a state supreme court would hold that its
choice-of-law rules bind federal and sister state courts when determining whether the
state’s law can be used. But even if Roosevelt is right that state courts want their
choice-of-law rules to be used by federal and sister state courts, I see no evidence that
Klaxon is about respecting such state interests. Klaxon concerns the twin aims, not
Erie.
113 Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941).
114 I am skeptical that a state would consider its choice-of-law rules to extend
beyond its court system. For a discussion, see Green, supra note 85, at 171–84.
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sylvania’s more weighty ones.115 The twin aims frustrate the interest
of the state that cares the most about the matter. In contrast, if federal courts were concerned solely about state interests, to the exclusion of the twin aims, they would be driven to abandon Klaxon and
apply a uniform federal choice-of-law rule that recommended the law
of the most interested state.116
To repeat, the twin aims and state interests can be in conflict,
because they can point to different states’ legal rules. But the distinction between the twin aims and state interests is significant even when
they both recommend the rules of the forum state. In such a case, the
twin aims and state interests are independent reasons to use the
forum state’s rules, each of which must be taken into account. If the
forum state is not interested in its rules applying in federal court, the
twin aims can recommend that forum state rules be borrowed nevertheless. And if the federal court is on the fence about whether the
twin aims recommend that the forum state’s rule be used, the appeal
to state interests can be crucial in recommending the forum state rule
over a uniform federal procedural common law rule.117
II.

JUSTIFYING

THE

TWIN AIMS

In the preceding pages, I have done my best to spell out current
law on how relatively unguided cases should be decided and how the
role the twin aims play differs from attention to state interests. But
the question remains: Why the twin aims? What is good about vertical
uniformity?
Consider Guaranty Trust Co. v. York. As we have seen, it was
entirely possible that the New York Court of Appeals would have held
115 It is constitutionally permissible for a state court to prefer forum interests over
the stronger interests of sister states. See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 422 (1979);
Pac. Emp’rs Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 306 U.S. 493, 500 (1939).
116 Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L.
REV. 489, 512–15 (1954) (criticizing “triviality” of avoiding forum shopping and recommending Klaxon be abandoned).
117 A possible example is Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996),
in which Justices Scalia and Ginsburg came to different conclusions about whether,
under a relatively unguided analysis, a federal district court in New York entertaining
an action under New York law should use the New York or federal standard for reviewing a jury’s award of damages as excessive. Ginsburg, who understood New York’s
standard as substantive, id. at 429, concluded that it should be used by the district
court, id. at 438–39. In contrast, Scalia, who argued that New York’s standard was
procedural, concluded that even under a relatively unguided analysis the district
court should use the federal standard. Id. at 463–68 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In coming to different conclusions about how the relatively unguided analysis should turn
out, their differing views about New York’s interests clearly played a role.
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that its statute of limitations did not follow New York actions into
other court systems.118 As far as New York was concerned, the plaintiffs could forum shop for a favorable limitations period for their New
York actions all they wanted. If so, why was it wrong for them to
forum shop vertically between federal and state court in New York? If
New York does not care about forum shopping, why should federal
courts? Once they are dissociated from state interests, the twin aims
desperately stand in need of a justification.
This puzzle has inspired some academics to reject the twin aims
entirely. A state’s rules should be used by federal courts only if the
state wants them to. As Allan Stein put it: “If a state has not attempted
to ‘vest’ a litigant with a right to a particular procedure, it is nonsense
to view the federal departure from that procedure as unfair to the
party.”119 Richard Freer has made the same point: “[I]f applying state
law would not advance a state policy, there is no reason for the federal
court to do so, even if failing to do so would be outcome
determinative.”120
My goal in this Article to respond to these doubts by offering a
justification of the twin aims in terms of federal jurisdictional interests. This justification is important not merely as a response to academic skeptics., but also because without it, federal courts will be
constantly in danger of confusing the twin aims with state interests—
as Posner’s opinion in Harbor Insurance shows.
A. The Rules of Decision Act?
Identifying the federal purposes the twin aims serve means figuring out exactly where the twin aims come from. Here, past accounts
have been clearly inadequate. Most are content to follow John Hart
Ely121 and point to the Rules of Decision Act122—originally section 34
of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which created the lower federal court
system. The Act states that “[t]he laws of the several states, except
where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of deci118 See supra Part I.C.
119 Allan R. Stein, Erie and Court Access, 100 YALE L.J. 1935, 1955 (1991); see also id.
at 1941.
120 Freer, supra note 62, at 1650.
121 Ely, supra note 75, at 722–23.
122 See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 38–41 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chi., 803 F.2d 304, 314 (7th Cir. 1986);
Olympic Sports Prods., Inc. v. Universal Athletic Sales Co., 760 F.2d 910, 913 (9th Cir.
1985); Feinstein v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 643 F.2d 880, 889 (1st Cir. 1981); Stoner v.
Presbyterian Univ. Hosp., 609 F.2d 109, 111 (3d Cir. 1979).

R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-4\NDL403.txt

2013]

unknown

the twin aims of

Seq: 25

ERIE

22-MAY-13

9:22

1889

sion in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where
they apply.”123 But the twin aims cannot be justified through the Act.
First of all, it is probably the case that the Act puts no duty upon a
federal court to favor state law over federal common law. Under this
reading the Act is irrelevant not merely to the twin aims. It was irrelevant even in Erie. There was nothing in the Act that prevented the
federal court in Erie from applying a federal common law standard
concerning Erie’s duty of care.
As Wilfred Ritz has put this reading, the Act—by referring generally to “the laws of the several states”—is simply a “direction to the
national courts to apply American law, as distinguished from English
law.”124 The Act makes it clear, post revolution, that American rather
than English law should be used in federal courts. But it says nothing
about the division of common lawmaking power between federal and
state courts. Thus, the Act does not recommend that a federal court
facing a relatively unguided case prefer state law over an independent
federal procedural common law rule.
But let us set aside this reading and assume, as Brandeis did in
Erie, that the Act does indeed put an obligation on federal courts to
use applicable state law rather than federal common law. The Act still
does nothing to justify the twin aims,125 for the twin aims recommend
123 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006). This is the Act in its current form, which is not different from the original form in any respect relevant here.
124 WILFRED J. RITZ, REWRITING THE HISTORY OF THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789, at 148
(Wythe Holt & L.H. LaRue eds., 1990); see also Patrick J. Borchers, The Origins of
Diversity Jurisdiction, the Rise of Legal Positivism, and a Brave New World for Erie and
Klaxon, 72 TEX. L. REV. 79, 107–10 (1993); Suzanna Sherry, Overruling Erie: Nationwide Class Actions and National Common Law, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 2135, 2137–38 (2008).
Some argue that the Rules of Decision Act was compatible with Swift, because the
general common law was not thought to be the sort of “law” to which the Act applied.
E.g., JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 502–03 (1971); William A. Fletcher, The General
Common Law and Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789: The Example of Marine Insurance,
97 HARV. L. REV. 1513 (1984). These writers assume, however, that the Act did limit
federal courts’ common lawmaking power, by obligating them to respect state common law that was local, as well as state statutes. E.g., id. at 1514. Ritz, as I understand
him, argues that the Act did not even put a duty on federal courts to prefer those state
laws over federal common law. To be sure, there was such an obligation—one that
followed from the constitutional structure of the American legal system—but the Act
had nothing to say about the matter.
125 So understood, the Act would be redundant, since those obligations would
already exist due to constitutional limits on federal lawmaking power. See Hawkins v.
Barney’s Lessee, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 457, 464 (1831) (“[Section 34 of the Judiciary Act is]
no more than a declaration of what the law would have been without it . . . .”); Agency
Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 162 (1987) (Scalia, J., concur-
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that federal courts use state rules that do not apply—that is, rules the
state supreme court would not say should be used by a federal
court.126
To ground the twin aims in the Act, we would have to understand
the Act as somehow recommending that federal courts incorporate
state standards into federal common law.127 But such a reading is
implausible.128 The first problem is that the Act’s language is categorical. It states that “[t]he laws of the several states . . . shall be regarded
as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United
States . . . .”129 If this language refers to incorporation of forum state
law into federal procedural common law, it would appear to mandate
such incorporation, not politely recommend it if it is necessary to
avoid forum shopping and the inequitable administration of the laws
and if there are no countervailing federal interests.130
The second problem is that the Act speaks generally of “the laws
of the several states,” without identifying which state’s law is to be
used. If the Act were understood as enforcing federal courts’ obligations to use applicable state law, this omission would be understandable. Which state’s law it referred to would be determined by looking
to which state’s law applied, as decided by the relevant states’ supreme
courts.131 But if the Act concerns incorporation, it is essential to know
the state whose law should be incorporated. The Act says nothing
about the law of the forum state.132 To appeal to the Act as the
ground of the twin aims is to provide no answer at all.
ring); Mason v. United States, 260 U.S. 545, 559 (1923); Alfred Hill, The Erie Doctrine
in Bankruptcy, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1013, 1024–31 (1953).
126 See Louise Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 805, 816 (1989)
(“The Rules of Decision Act says that state law shall furnish the rules of decision in
federal civil actions, in cases in which they apply. But what about cases in which they
do not apply?” (footnote omitted)).
127 Stephen B. Burbank, Afterwords: A Response to Professor Hazard and a Comment on
Marrese, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 659, 661 & n.18 (1985); Alfred Hill, State Procedural Law
in Federal Nondiversity Litigation, 69 HARV. L. REV. 66, 76–90 (1955).
128 See Westen & Lehman, supra note 27, at 365–73; Peter Westen, After “Life for
Erie”—A Reply, 78 MICH. L. REV. 971, 982–89 (1980).
129 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006) (emphasis added).
130 Westen, supra note 128, at 989.
131 And in situations in which more than one applied, common law choice-of-law
rules would be used. Fletcher, supra note 124, at 1514–15.
132 Rowe, supra note 50, at 985 n.85 (“The great generality of the Act’s ‘in cases
where they apply’ phrasing . . . gives little if any guidance as to when they should apply,
leaving just how to make the ‘relatively unguided Erie choice’ up to judicial interpretation . . . .” (citation omitted)).
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B. The Solution: The Diversity Statute
Fortunately an obvious alternative is available. This is the diversity statute. Article III is commonly understood to have extended the
federal judicial power to diversity (and alienage133) cases to provide
non-domiciliaries with a neutral federal forum, as a protection against
the prejudice they might experience in state courts.134 The twin aims
can be drawn from this purpose.
Admittedly, Congress has not always taken advantage of its power
to send diversity cases to federal court with state court prejudice
against non-domiciliaries in mind.135 An example is statutory interpleader, which creates federal jurisdiction for minimal diversity
actions in which a plaintiff seeks to settle rival claims to property.136
Congress created statutory interpleader, not because of worries about
prejudice in state court, but to allow the plaintiff to take advantage of
the broader personal jurisdictional reach of federal courts.137 Armed
with nationwide service of process,138 she can drag all potential claimants into one proceeding, thereby protecting herself against inconsistent or multiple liability. Likewise, the Class Action Fairness Act,139
which also relies on minimal diversity, was enacted because of congressional frustration at the way state courts were certifying class
actions—misdeeds that were not necessarily tied to bias against out-ofstate defendants.140
But even though Article III does not require Congress to use its
diversity power solely to protect against state court bias against nondomiciliaries, it is widely believed that the core provision of the diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), which created federal jurisdiction for
controversies between citizens that are completely diverse,141 was
133 Alienage jurisdiction concerns suits between citizens of a state and citizens or
subjects of a foreign state. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2). My reading in this Article applies equally to both.
134 See Bank of U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809); Borchers, supra
note 124, at 79–80; Susan Randall, Sovereign Immunity and the Uses of History, 81 NEB. L.
REV. 1, 66–70 (2002).
135 The power is derived from Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution, which extends the judicial power to controversies “between Citizens of different
States” and “Citizens [of a State] and foreign . . . Citizens or Subjects.”
136 28 U.S.C. § 1335(a)(1).
137 Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Abolishing Diversity Jurisdiction: Positive Side Effects and
Potential for Further Reforms, 92 HARV. L. REV. 963, 1007–08 (1979).
138 28 U.S.C. § 2361.
139 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d)(2), 1453(b).
140 Stephen B. Burbank, Aggregation on the Couch: The Strategic Uses of Ambiguity and
Hypocrisy, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1924, 1950 (2006).
141 Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267–68 (1806).
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enacted with that purpose in mind.142 And the twin aims, I will argue,
follow from this purpose.
1. Forum Shopping
The argument concerning the first of the twin aims is relatively
straightforward. Forum shopping due to significantly different federal and forum state procedure would frustrate the goal of protecting
non-domiciliaries from state court bias. Assume a New Yorker wishes
to sue a Pennsylvanian in Pennsylvania. If federal procedure differs
substantially from the procedure in Pennsylvania state court, the New
Yorker might be compelled to choose Pennsylvania state court,
despite worries about pro-domiciliary bias there, because the disadvantages of federal procedure are too great. Or, sued by the Pennsylvanian in Pennsylvania state court, she might refrain from removing
to federal court. Furthermore, if the New Yorker did not fear state
court bias but saw an advantage in federal procedure, she might
choose the federal forum, thereby wasting the federal court’s time
and effort on a case unrelated to the purposes of diversity.
This justification of the first of the twin aims provides a rough
measure of how substantial the procedural differences between federal and forum state courts must be before the first aim is implicated.
The differences would have to be significant enough to discourage
recourse to federal court by someone who feared state court bias and
to encourage someone to seek out federal court even though she did
not fear such bias.
Admittedly, uniformity with the courts of the forum state serves
the purposes of diversity only if the party’s choice would be vertical,
between state and federal courts within a state, rather than diagonal,
between a state court and a federal court in a sister state. In cases of
removal, the fact that the defendant’s choice was vertical would be
assured. But when the plaintiff sues originally in federal court, she
may have made a diagonal choice.
Assume, for example, that a New Yorker wishes to sue a Pennsylvanian. If the only two fora she is willing to consider are a state
142 See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181, 1192 (2010); Burford v. Sun Oil Co.,
319 U.S. 315, 336 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Borchers, supra note 124,
79–80; John P. Frank, Historical Bases of the Federal Judicial System, 13 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 3, 22–28 (1948). This is true even though the diversity statute is poorly drafted
to effectuate that purpose: it allows a New Yorker to sue a Pennsylvanian in federal
court in New York, even though any pro-domiciliary bias in New York state court
would be to her benefit, and allows a New Yorker to sue a Pennsylvanian in federal
court in Delaware, even though a Delaware state court biased against non-domiciliaries would find no one to favor.

R

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-4\NDL403.txt

2013]

unknown

the twin aims of

Seq: 29

ERIE

22-MAY-13

9:22

1893

court in Pennsylvania and a federal court in New York, the federal
court would ensure that her decision is not influenced by procedural
differences only if it mimicked a Pennsylvania rather than a New York
state court. In an ideal world, federal courts would borrow the rules
that would be used, not necessarily by the courts of the forum state,
but by courts of the state where the action would have been brought
but for diversity jurisdiction. The practical difficulties of discerning
the plaintiff’s intent, however, as well as the relative infrequency of
diagonal choice, counsel in favor of borrowing the rules that would be
used by a forum state court.143 If federal courts sitting in diversity
borrow forum state procedure, the plaintiff would usually find her
choice to invoke a federal forum uninfluenced by procedural considerations, even if she might engage in substantial horizontal forum
shopping between courts (whether federal or state) in sister states.144
Notice, however, that the fact that the choice between federal
and state fora is usually vertical is the result of a contingent decision
by Congress, namely to place a federal district court in each state.
Had Congress created only one court for all diversity cases, located in
Missouri, the federal goal of discouraging procedural forum shopping
would not be realized if the federal court borrowed from the procedure of Missouri state courts. It would have to mimic the courts of the
state where the action would have been brought but for diversity,
something that would be difficult to determine except in cases of
removal.
Given the current distribution of federal courts, however, the
purposes of diversity recommend uniformity with forum state courts.
The question remains, however, why the goal of ensuring procedural
uniformity rests upon federal courts. Why not demand that state courts
use federal procedure when entertaining state law actions that could
have been brought in federal court under diversity? Federal regulation of state court procedure to protect federal jurisdiction is not
unprecedented.145 It is conceivable, therefore, that by giving state
143 As we shall later see, this assumption is not justified in connection with bankruptcy. See infra Part III.B.2.
144 The problem of horizontal forum shopping, which would occur in the absence
of diversity, is not a concern to which the twin aims are addressed. See Klaxon Co. v.
Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941) (“Whatever lack of uniformity [the
Klaxon rule] may produce between federal courts in different states is attributable to
our federal system, which leaves to a state, within the limits permitted by the Constitution, the right to pursue local policies diverging from those of its neighbors.”);
Michael Steven Green, Erie’s International Effect, 107 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 165,
171–72 (2012).
145 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d), if a state law action that had supplemental jurisdiction in federal court is dismissed and is subsequently brought in state court, that court
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courts concurrent jurisdiction over diversity cases, Congress commanded state courts to use the rules existing in federal courts. If so,
federal courts would be free to create common law rules for litigating
diversity actions for whatever reason they saw fit. For example, they
could determine the proper time limit for such actions. Having made
their choice, state courts would be bound to follow.
No one has ever even entertained this possibility.146 Why not?
The reason must be that everyone, including the Supreme Court,
assumes that the diversity statute did not change the procedural
power that state courts possessed over state law actions (including
actions under sister state law).147 That Article III did not change state
courts’ power over diversity cases is suggested in The Federalist No. 82,
where Hamilton argued that extension of the federal judicial power to
diversity cases did not strip state courts of the jurisdiction they had
over such cases before the Union.148 This retained jurisdiction should
include plenary power over procedure. And although Congress probably could divest state courts of these retained powers, everyone
assumes that it has not chosen to do so.149 The diversity statute left
must treat the relevant statute of limitations as tolled during the time the action was
pending in federal court, and for 30 days after dismissal, unless state law provides for
a longer tolling period. Section 1367(d) has been upheld as “necessary and proper
for carrying into execution Congress’s power ‘[t]o constitute Tribunals inferior to the
supreme Court,’ and to assure that those tribunals may fairly and efficiently exercise
‘[t]he judicial Power of the United States.’ ” Jinks v. Richland Cnty., 538 U.S. 456, 462
(2003) (citation omitted). For a discussion of federal regulation of state court procedures in a broader context, see Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Federal Regulation of State Court
Procedures, 110 YALE L.J. 947 (2001).
146 Louise Weinberg has come closest. Louise Weinberg, The Power of Congress over
Courts in Nonfederal Cases, 1995 BYU L. REV. 731, 766 (1995) (noting federal grants of
concurrent jurisdiction to state courts for state law actions might generate “adjudicatory policies” that become supreme in state courts).
147 Tellingly, Weinberg is inclined to understand state courts’ possession of concurrent jurisdiction for diversity actions as a positive federal grant, in which state
courts sit “as courts of the nation.” Id. at 760.
148 THE FEDERALIST No. 82 (Alexander Hamilton).
149 One exception is that—as participants in the new federal order—they may not
create procedural rules that discriminate against sister state or federal causes of
action. See Hart, supra note 116, at 507. Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951), is
commonly understood as holding that a state court may not discriminate against sister
state law. See Lea Brilmayer & Stefan Underhill, Congressional Obligation to Provide a
Forum for Constitutional Claims: Discriminatory Jurisdictional Rules and the Conflict of Laws,
69 VA. L. REV. 819, 825–26 (1983); Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws,
and the Unconstitutional Public Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965, 1980–86 (1997).
Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947), is commonly understood as holding that a state
court may not discriminate against federal law. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Oldest
Question of Constitutional Law, 79 VA. L. REV. 633, 643 n.50 (1993); Laurence H. Tribe,
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state courts entertaining diversity cases with their preexisting power to
create procedural law to effectuate any legitimate forum purpose.150
Federal courts sitting in diversity, in contrast, were understood by
Congress as subsidiary fora within each state designed to address a particular problem with the state’s courts—namely, bias against nondomiciliaries. Having been granted jurisdiction for that purpose, it is
they who have the obligation to ensure procedural uniformity (unless
sufficiently strong countervailing federal interests exist).
My reading of the forum shopping prong of the twin aims
explains why it does not apply horizontally to procedural differences
between state court systems. When a New York state court entertains a
Pennsylvania cause of action, it does not generally think of itself as a
subsidiary forum to Pennsylvania state courts. If it did understand its
jurisdiction in this way, it too might have a duty (under New York law)
to ensure procedural uniformity with Pennsylvania state courts, so that
parties would seek it out only for the right reasons. In general, however, a New York state court considers itself free to create procedural
law on the basis of any legitimate New York interest, without concern
for whether forum shopping will result.151 To be sure, it may have a
duty to respect Pennsylvania rules that are bound up with the Pennsylvania action when they conflict with what would otherwise be valid
New York procedural law.152 But it has no reason to mimic Pennsylvania rules that Pennsylvania officials do not even want to follow
Pennsylvania actions into New York courts, simply to regulate the flow
of Pennsylvania actions into New York courts.
To say that state courts do not have a general obligation under
their own law to mimic sister state procedure when entertaining sister
state causes of action, does not mean that they cannot have an obligation in particular cases. An example is when a forum state has a borrowing statute. The New York legislature, not wanting plaintiffs to
come to the state’s courts solely to take advantage of its longer statute
of limitations, can command its courts to borrow the sister state’s statIntergovernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation: Separation of Powers
Issues in Controversies About Federalism, 89 HARV. L. REV. 682, 692 n.62 (1976).
150 By using the term “legitimate,” I intend to include two potential types of
restriction on state courts’ power over procedure. Restrictions of the first type arise
when the plaintiff sues under sister state law. In such cases, the forum state’s power
over procedure might be limited when it conflicts with applicable sister state law. See
supra note 105. Restrictions of the second type include limits that state legislation
might have upon the procedural common law powers of state courts (limitations that
would surely not be as restrictive as the twin aims).
151 The same point is true of the New York legislature.
152 See supra note 105.
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ute of limitations when the plaintiff sues under sister state law.153 Like
the twin aims, borrowing statutes employ the sister state’s limitations
period whether or not the sister state’s supreme court would agree.154
The goal is not fidelity to sister state law, but the satisfaction of forum
interests. For this reason, borrowing statutes are understood, not as
stating that the sister state’s limitations period truly applies in the
forum, but as specifying that the forum’s limitations period should
mimic the sister state’s.155
In such a case, a New York state court acts very much like a federal court using the twin aims. Indeed, one might say that, under my
reading, the twin aims amount to a federal borrowing statute. But unlike
state borrowing statutes, the twin aims extend well beyond statutes of
limitations to many other aspects of the forum state’s procedure. This
is because the jurisdictional purposes of federal courts sitting in diversity demand more borrowing. Not only does Congress not want litigants to seek a federal forum because of its longer (or shorter)
limitations period, it wants to discourage forum shopping for any reason except the goal for which diversity jurisdiction was created—
unless sufficiently substantial countervailing federal interests in favor
of a uniform federal rule exist.
2. Inequitable Administration of the Laws
I have explained the first of the twin aims in terms of the purposes of the diversity statute. Explaining the second takes more work.
Consider a federal common law limitations period for diversity cases
that is shorter than the period that would be used in a forum state
court. Why is this shorter period unfair to plaintiffs in diversity cases
who are disfavored by it? And why is it unfair to defendants in nondiversity cases who cannot take advantage of it?
Furthermore, if it is unfair for federal courts to create a shorter
limitations period, why is it not also unfair for Congress to do so? It
sounds odd to say that Congress is free to be unfair to litigants if it
wants, but that federal courts cannot. Of course, Congress might find
it necessary to create some inequity as a side effect of pursuing
another purpose—and it probably has the power, absent other consti153 See the examples cited in Donna Mae Endreson, Note, Wisconsin’s Borrowing
Statute: Did We Shortchange Ourselves?, 70 MARQ. L. REV. 120, 122–27 (1986). Borrowing statutes vary greatly in their details but they generally borrow the statute of limitations of the state where the cause of action arose, which is (or should be) the state
under whose law the plaintiff sues.
154 Indeed, if the sister state did think its limitations period were applicable, the
borrowing statute would be unnecessary.
155 See Trzecki v. Gruenewald, 532 S.W.2d 209 (Mo. 1979) (en banc).
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tutional considerations, to do so. But in those cases in which Congress has used its diversity power to create significant procedural
differences between federal and forum state courts, the result is not
described as “inequitable but nevertheless justified.” It is not
described as inequitable at all. For example, I have never heard anyone say that nationwide service of process in statutory interpleader
actions is inequitable administration of the laws.
The solution is to read the second aim as concerned, not with
inequity in some general sense, but with inequity given congressional
purposes. After all, the very existence of diversity jurisdiction gives
diverse parties something that non-diverse parties don’t have—a federal forum. This differential treatment of diverse and non-diverse parties is not inequitable, because it can be justified by the congressional
purpose of protecting against state court bias. Likewise, statutory
interpleader is not inequitable, because the differential treatment of
diversity and non-diversity cases is justified by the congressional desire
to use its diversity power to provide those vulnerable to multiple or
inconsistent liability with a forum in which all possible claimants can
be subject to personal jurisdiction.
On the other hand, a short federal procedural common law limitations period in diversity cases is inequitable, for the limitations
period does nothing to help provide the parties with an alternative
forum in the state free of pro-domiciliary bias. Indeed, it can frustrate
that purpose by discouraging those fearful of bias from seeking the
federal court’s protection. Because the creation of such a time limit
cannot be justified by the purpose of diversity—or by countervailing
federal interests of sufficient strength—plaintiffs in diversity cases and
defendants in non-diversity cases can legitimately complain that federal courts are treating them unfairly.
Once the inequitable administration of the laws is understood in
the light of congressional purposes, it follows that Congress is not limited by the twin aims. As we have seen, Congress is not obligated to
employ its diversity power under Article III solely to protect non-domiciliaries against state court bias. It can use its power to satisfy very
different purposes. Furthermore, having enacted § 1332(a) in order
to address state court bias, it can regulate the procedure of federal
courts sitting in diversity cases in order to satisfy other purposes, even
though the new procedure compromises the original goal for which
§ 1332(a) was created.
For example, Congress may want to pass a short statute of limitations for state law actions brought in federal court, because it thinks
that the evidence in even moderately tardy actions is unreliable. In
creating time limits that differ from those of the forum state, the goal
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of protecting against pro-domiciliary bias in state courts will be
severely compromised. Many non-domiciliary plaintiffs who fear bias
will avoid federal court because they will be barred by the statute of
limitations there. And non-domiciliary defendants who do not fear
bias will remove to federal court, in order to get the action dismissed.
Rather than protecting against state court bias, the functional effect of
this new scheme will be to protect all defendants in diversity cases
from moderately tardy state law actions. But this remains permissible,
for, as we have seen, Congress is not restricted in the purposes for
which it uses its diversity power.
This reading also explains why the second of the twin aims does
not apply horizontally to procedural differences between state court
systems. States are free to create procedural law to satisfy any number
of legitimate local purposes, even for cases in which their courts entertain sister state causes of action. Borrowing statutes aside, there is
nothing analogous to the limitation on regulatory purposes that Congress has put on federal courts. For this reason, horizontal differences
in procedure are not the inequitable administration of the laws.
Finally, this reading explains why Chief Justice Warren mentions
the inequitable administration of the laws in Hanna as a separate consideration from forum shopping. Assume that Congress thought that
state court bias was such a problem that it gave exclusive federal subject
matter jurisdiction to diversity cases. If so, there would be no worry
about forum shopping. A party would have no choice about whether
the action proceeded in federal or state court (except by changing
domicile). Would it follow that federal courts could create a short
common law limitations period for diversity actions to protect against
unreliable evidence? If the only consideration were forum shopping,
the answer would be yes.
But if federal courts did so, plaintiffs in diversity cases and
defendants in non-diversity cases could still complain about the inequitable administration of the laws. Federal courts would be choosing
a limitations period on the basis of considerations unrelated to the
purpose of diversity jurisdiction. Congress, we are assuming, gave federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over diversity cases to make sure the
parties were before a court free of bias, not to give federal courts an
opportunity to solve nuanced evidentiary problems through common
law time limits. Even with forum shopping out of the picture, avoiding the inequitable administration of the laws still requires federal
courts to borrow the limitations period that would be used by a forum
state court.
In short, the second of the twin aims is grounded in the fundamental idea standing behind diversity jurisdiction—that is, that a fed-

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-4\NDL403.txt

2013]

unknown

the twin aims of

Seq: 35

ERIE

22-MAY-13

9:22

1899

eral court sitting in diversity was offered by Congress as a subsidiary
forum in each state in order to address particular deficiencies of state
courts. It follows that the forum state court was conceived by Congress as the presumptive forum for the action and federal procedural
common law that deviates in its content from the procedure in that
court must be justified—for example, on the basis of substantial countervailing federal interests.156 Even if there is no possibility of forum
shopping, a reason for uniformity with forum state courts remains.
Notice that in saying that the twin aims are rooted in a conception of federal courts as subsidiary to state courts, I do not mean that
they protect state interests. The subsidiary role of federal courts is the
consequence of a federal conception their role. Federal courts are subsidiary whatever states say about the matter.
Notice as well that my reading of the twin aims does not depend
upon whether I am right about the particular purposes of § 1332(a).
Let us assume, as some have argued, that diversity jurisdiction exists to
protect commercial interests, wherever those with the interests might
be domiciled.157 Although that might make some difference to the
twin aims—there might be no borrowing of forum state procedure
that was antagonistic to commercial interests, for example—it would
not free federal courts of the twin aims in general.
The only way that the twin aims would not apply to federal courts
sitting in diversity is if Congress did not understand federal courts as a
subsidiary forum in each state meant to address some deficiency with
the state court system, but instead understood them as having coequal
jurisdictional authority with state courts. So understood, a federal
court entertaining an action under Pennsylvania law would have the
same procedural power as a New York state court does. Each could
pursue legitimate forum interests as it sees fit (except, perhaps, if
these interests conflict with rules that are bound up with the Pennsylvania cause of action). Let us call this the equality approach.
Academic critics of the twin aims, such as Allan Stein and Richard
Freer, assume the equality approach.158 Some early voices on the
Court, like Justice Jackson’s dissent in Woods and Justice Rutledge’s
dissent in York,159 also assumed this approach. A federal court can
156 Another justification for a deviation from forum state rules is that it is insignificant, as evidenced by the fact that it will not generate significant forum shopping if
parties are given a choice between federal and state court.
157 Henry J. Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REV. 483,
498–99 (1928).
158 See supra text accompanying notes 119–120.
159 Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535, 538–40 (1949); Guar. Trust Co. v.
York, 326 U.S. 99, 112–19 (1945).
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apply a uniform federal procedural common law rule precisely when a
state court entertaining a sister state cause of action could apply its
own procedural law. Although there was a battle between the twin
aims and the equality approaches in the first few decades after Erie was
decided, eventually the twin aims won out.
C. Separation of Powers
To repeat, under my reading, the twin aims do not have their
source in federalism concerns about respect for state interests. They
instead are meant to protect the federal interests standing behind the
diversity statute. So understood, they are tied to separation of powers,
not Erie.
It is important to recognize that my reading is not that the twin
aims limit federal courts’ power to create federal procedural common
law. Because the twin aims do not look to whether states are interested in their law applying in federal court, the creation of federal
procedural common law is inescapable. The congressional limit is
instead on the content of this law—namely, whether it should incorporate the law that would be applied by a forum state court.
For this reason, my reading should be distinguished from those
that tie the twin aims to separation of powers and federalism. This
passage from Justice Scalia’s opinion in Shady Grove is an example:
We must acknowledge the reality that keeping the federal-court
door open to class actions that cannot proceed in state court will
produce forum shopping. That is unacceptable when it comes as
the consequence of judge-made rules created to fill supposed “gaps”
in positive federal law. For where neither the Constitution, a treaty,
nor a statute provides the rule of decision or authorizes a federal
court to supply one, “state law must govern because there can be no
other law.”160

As we have seen, this account of the twin aims cannot work. If the
forum state is not interested in its law applying in federal court (or
federal courts do not care whether it is interested), it makes no sense
to say that “state law must govern because there can be no other law.”
It would be a serious perversion of the principles of federalism in Erie
to extend forum state law to federal courts against (or without regard
to) the likely decision of the state’s supreme court.
160 Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431,
1447–48 (2010) (citing Bradford R. Clark, Erie’s Constitutional Source, 95 CAL. L. REV.
1289, 1302, 1311 (2007)).
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Consider Guaranty Trust Co. v. York.161 As we have seen, it was
probable that New York was not interested in its statute of limitations
applying in federal court—and, in any event, the Supreme Court did
not care whether it was.162 Since, as far as the Court was concerned,
the New York statute of limitations did not apply, and no federal statute or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure governed the matter, the time
limit imposed had to be federal procedural common law.163 The twin
aims did not keep the federal court from creating a federal common
law limitations period in York. All it did was limit its discretion in
determining what the limitations period was.
Although federalism is not a concern in the twin aims, separation
of powers is. Separation of powers limits when federal courts can
identify countervailing federal interests that override the twin aims’
command. After all, if federal courts could appeal to countervailing
federal interests at will, the twin aims would be toothless.
One possible reading of this separation-of-powers limitation on
the content of federal procedural common law is that a federal court
can point only to enacted law when identifying countervailing federal
interests. This reading is supported by Byrd itself, for the Court
looked to the Seventh Amendment to argue that there was a “federal
policy” (not rising to the level of a constitutional demand) “favoring
jury decisions of disputed fact questions.”164 But in other cases, federal courts have felt free to find countervailing federal interests without identifying their source in enacted law.
Consider whether a federal court sitting in diversity should use
forum state or federal standards for dismissing an action on forum non
conveniens grounds. Federal courts addressing this question have concluded that the difference between the two standards would indeed
motivate forum shopping.165 Plaintiffs would choose whichever
forum was less likely to dismiss. Nevertheless, these courts have concluded that countervailing federal interests favor the federal standard.
When the federal standard recommends dismissal more than the
forum state’s, the countervailing federal interests include the court’s
need to “police and control its own docket against a floodgate of for161 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
162 See supra Part I.C.
163 The only other option would be to refuse to take jurisdiction of the action,
which federal courts are forbidden to do under such circumstances. See Meredith v.
Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 234 (1943).
164 Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 538 (1958).
165 See, e.g., In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, La. on July 9, 1982, 821
F.2d 1147, 1157–58 (5th Cir. 1987) [hereinafter In re Air Crash New Orleans], vacated
on other grounds, Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Lopez, 490 U.S. 1032 (1989).
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eign lawsuits”166 and its desire to avoid deciding complicated issues of
foreign law.167 When the federal standard recommends retaining
cases that forum state courts would dismiss, the federal interests
include the court’s desire to assure “that, as a general rule, United
States citizens have access to the courts of this country for resolution
of their disputes.”168 And, in both cases, federal interests in foreign
relations are implicated.169 As a result, federal courts have uniformly
held that the federal standard for forum non conveniens should be
employed.170
None of these countervailing federal interests, although undoubtedly genuine, was tied to any particular federal enacted law. Thus, it is
fair to conclude that although the twin aims put some separation-ofpowers limits on the content of federal procedural common law, these
limits are not so strong that they can be overridden only by appeal to
federal enacted law.171
D. A State-Interest Reading
So far I have argued that the twin aims are unconcerned with
state interests. They are about uniformity with forum state courts,
whether or not the forum state’s supreme court wants such uniformity. State interests come into play in relatively undecided Erie cases, I
argued, only through Byrd’s bound-up test, which is directed toward
the relevant state supreme court’s likely decision.
One might argue, however, that the fact that the twin aims do not
look to the forum state supreme court’s likely decision is not because
they are unconcerned with state interests, but because no relevant
decision will ever be found. Unless the matter is certified, a state
supreme court will never have occasion to opine about whether a state
166 Esfeld v. Costa Crociere, S.P.A., 289 F.3d 1300, 1309 (11th Cir. 2002).
167 In re Air Crash New Orleans, 821 F.2d at 1159.
168 Esfeld, 289 F.3d at 1311.
169 Id. at 1312.
170 See 14D CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3828.5
(2009).
171 Indeed, the expansive manner in which countervailing federal interests are
identified suggests that federal courts might have the power to create their own uniform common law time limit for diversity actions after all, and that the twin aims,
rather than having their source in separation of powers, are purely self-imposed. For
an expansive account of federal courts’ power to create federal common law, in which
most declared limits are actually prudential and self-imposed, see Weinberg, supra
note 126. More restrictive accounts can be found in Thomas W. Merrill, The Common
Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1985); Redish, supra note 76.
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rule should be used in other court systems.172 When taking cases on
appeal from lower state courts, it has a reason to decide only what
rules those courts should use. Whether sister state or federal courts
should use the state’s rules must be faced by the sister state and federal courts, despite the fact that those courts cannot make authoritative pronouncements on the matter.
Because there will be no relevant state supreme court decisions,
arguably a presumption about state interests should be used. Under
the state-interest reading, the twin aims are this presumption. Federal
courts presume that the forum state supreme court would hold that its
rule extends only to federal courts within its borders. The Byrd test, in
contrast, seeks to identify a more significant state interest that cannot
be presumed to exist, namely that the state supreme court wishes its
rule to follow the state’s cause of action into all court systems.
On this reading, Guaranty Trust Co. v. York was about New York
interests after all. The question in York was whether a federal court in
New York entertaining New York causes of action should use New
York’s limitations period or a unique period drawn from federal procedural common law. It was unlikely that the Byrd test recommended
that New York law be used. The New York Court of Appeals would
probably not have concluded that the limitations period followed New
York causes of action into other court systems. But under a state-interest reading of the twin aims, New York was still presumptively interested in its statute of limitations being used by federal courts within
New York.
I am skeptical about whether a state can legitimately seek to regulate the procedure of federal courts within its borders in this fashion.173 Furthermore, even if the state has such power, a presumption
that it would extend a state’s rules only to federal courts within the
state is implausible. Why would the New York Court of Appeals think
New York’s statute of limitations should apply beyond its own courts,
172 For a general discussion of this problem, see Green, supra note 85. Of course,
the same problem arises concerning Byrd’s bound-up test. See supra note 85.
173 In Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 49 (1825), Chief Justice Marshall
stated that there is no “original inherent power in the State legislatures, independent
of any act of Congress, to control the modes of proceeding in suits depending in the
Courts of the United States . . . .” Indeed he thought that the absence of such power
is “one of those political axioms, an attempt to demonstrate which, would be a waste
of argument not to be excused.” Id. It is unlikely that Marshall would have rejected
Justice Brennan’s position in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525
(1958)—that is, that a state can extend its procedural rules to federal courts by binding them up with the state’s causes of action. Marshall probably meant only that a
state cannot seek to regulate federal procedural more directly, by extending its rules
solely to federal courts within the state.
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but not think that it should be folded into New York causes of action?
A likely reason is that it wants to protect New York defendants against
untimely actions, even when such actions are not under New York
law.174 Given this interest, however, why would it hold that the statute
applies only to federal courts in New York? What about actions
brought against New York defendants in federal and state courts in
sister states? And why extend the statute to a federal court in New
York that is entertaining a state law action against a defendant not
from New York?
Another problem with a state-interest reading of the twin aims is
that it would follow that they bind federal courts entertaining actions
under federal law. If the New York Court of Appeals thinks New
York’s statute of limitations applies when a federal court in New York
entertains a Pennsylvania cause of action, why wouldn’t it think the
statute applies when the federal court entertains a federal cause of
action that lacks a limitations period of its own? My reading, in contrast, can explain the prevailing view that federal courts entertaining
federal question actions are not bound by the twin aims.175
Finally, a state-interest reading cannot account for cases like
Woods v. Interstate Realty Co.,176 in which the Court held that a federal
court in Mississippi should use a Mississippi rule even in the face of
evidence (or purported evidence) that Mississippi did not care
whether its rule was used in federal courts in the state. The decision
in Woods can be explained only on the basis of a theory in which the
twin aims serve federal jurisdictional purposes.
III. THE TWIN AIMS OUTSIDE DIVERSITY
To sum up, I have sought to justify the role the twin aims play in
diversity cases in terms of federal policies grounded in the diversity
statute. The question remains whether they play a role outside of
diversity. Because the twin aims have their source in federal jurisdictional policies, not concerns about state interests, there is no reason to
think that they must apply simply because a federal court entertains a
state law cause of action. The question must be answered on the basis
of the statute giving the federal court jurisdiction. Conversely, one
cannot conclude that the twin aims do not apply to a federal court
simply because it entertains a federal cause of action, for the federal
jurisdictional policies in the statute giving the federal court jurisdic174
(Wis.
175
176

See Air Products & Chem., Inc. v. Fairbanks Morse, Inc., 206 N.W.2d 414, 419
1973).
See infra Part III.A.1.
337 U.S. 535 (1949); see also Westen & Lehman, supra note 27, at 357–58.
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tion might implicate the twin aims. It is now time to consider these
matters.
A. Federal Causes of Action
The Supreme Court has held that federal courts have no duty to
ensure uniformity with forum state procedure when the plaintiff sues
under federal law.177 For example, a federal court entertaining a federal cause of action calculates prejudgment interest according to a
uniform federal common law rule,178 even though a federal court sitting in diversity must borrow the method that would be used by a
forum state court.179 Likewise, in Semtek the Supreme Court made it
clear that the claim-preclusive effect of a dismissal by a federal court
of a federal cause of action is governed by a uniform federal common
law rule,180 even though the claim-preclusive effect of a dismissal of a
state law action by a federal court sitting in diversity should be borrowed from forum state law.181
Similarly, a federal court entertaining an action under a federal
statute that lacks a limitations period has no duty under the twin aims
to incorporate the forum state’s period into a federal common law
rule.182 To be sure, federal courts find such incorporation conve177 Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 394 (1946) (“The considerations that
urge adjudication by the same law in all courts within a State when enforcing a right
created by that State are hardly relevant for determining the rules which bar enforcement of an equitable right created not by a State legislature but by Congress.”).
178 See Ford v. Uniroyal Pension Plan, 154 F.3d 613, 616–20 (6th Cir. 1998); Koch
v. Koch Indus., 996 F. Supp. 1273, 1279 (D. Kan. 1998).
179 Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Walbrook Ins. Co., 41 F.3d 764, 773–74 (1st Cir.
1994).
180 Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 508 (2001).
181 Id.
182 Justice Stevens has argued that the Rules of Decision Act requires federal
courts to borrow the forum state’s statute of limitations when a federal statute lacks a
limitations period of its own. See DelCostello v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151,
172–74 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting). For a criticism of such a reading of the Act,
see supra Part II.A. Justice Scalia has gone even further and argued that the forum
state’s statute of limitations is not borrowed, but applies of its own force to federal
causes of action in federal court. See Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs.,
483 U.S. 143, 157–65 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring). The notion that a forum state’s
limitations period applies of its own force to federal statutes lacking such a period is
implausible. Certainly, Scalia does not suggest that the forum state’s supreme court
would actually hold that the state’s statute of limitation applies in federal courts in
such cases. Indeed it is questionable whether states have the power to extend their
statute of limitations to federal courts in this fashion. See supra note 173.
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nient.183 Furthermore, since Congress can be understood to have
omitted a limitations period with this federal judicial practice in mind,
there is arguably a presumption in favor of such borrowing, a presumption that must be overcome by some significant federal interest.184 But the reason for borrowing is not the twin aims—that is, the
desire for uniformity with how a forum state court would treat the federal action. Concern with a forum state court’s treatment of the federal action is entirely absent.
The inapplicability of the twin aims in federal question actions is
sometimes justified on the ground that states lack any interest in their
rules applying in federal court in such cases.185 But such a justification presumes that the twin aims are connected to Erie’s goal of
respect for state lawmaking power, which we now know to be false.
The issue is not state interests, but the federal interests standing
behind the statute giving federal courts jurisdiction. So the question
remains: Why isn’t uniformity with forum state procedure recommended by the federal question statute?
1. Federal Question Jurisdiction
To answer this question, we must look to the purposes of federal
question jurisdiction.186 Three are usually offered: 1) federal judges
are more experienced in federal law and so are more likely to apply it
correctly; 2) federal courts are necessary to enforce the supremacy of
183 E.g., North Star Steel Co. v. Thomas, 515 U.S. 29, 34–36 (1995); Graham Cnty.
Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson, 545 U.S. 409, 415
(2005). 28 U.S.C. § 1658 (2006) establishes a four-year federal limitations period for
federal statutory causes of action, but it does not apply to federal statutes enacted
before December 1, 1990. For a broader interpretation of § 1658’s effect, see Abner
J. Mikva & James E. Pfander, Essay, On the Meaning of Congressional Silence: Using Federal
Common Law to Fill the Gap in Congress’s Residual Statute of Limitations, 107 YALE L.J. 393,
395 (1997).
184 North Star Steel, 515 U.S. at 33–34.
185 See Hill, supra note 127, at 91–96.
186 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006). Although I will speak here of federal question jurisdiction in particular, my analysis will apply to other statutes giving federal courts jurisdiction over actions under federal law. E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (giving federal
jurisdiction over federal civil rights actions). With the exception of a one-year trial in
1801, 2 Stat. 89, 92 (1801), federal question jurisdiction was not introduced in federal
trial courts until 1875. Judiciary Act of 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470. For a political
history of the 1875 Act, see Howard Gillman, How Political Parties Can Use the Courts to
Advance Their Agendas: Federal Courts in the United States, 1875–1891, 96 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 511 (2002); Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Safeguards of Federal Jurisdiction, 124
HARV. L. REV. 869, 888–99 (2011). There is virtually no legislative history concerning
the creation of federal question jurisdiction. James H. Chadbourn & A. Leo Levin,
Original Jurisdiction of Federal Questions, 90 U. PA. L. REV. 639, 642–45 (1942).
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federal law against a possibly hostile state judiciary; and 3) lower federal courts are needed, in addition to the Supreme Court, to resolve
any disuniformity that results from state court interpretation of federal law.187
Can we generate an argument that the twin aims apply in federal
question actions on the basis of these purposes? If state courts were
understood as the primary fora for federal causes of action, with federal question jurisdiction created solely to address the problem of
state courts’ incompetent, hostile, or disuniform interpretation of federal law, one might argue that Congress limited federal courts’ power
to create procedural common law by the twin aims.188 Under this
reading, Congress gave federal courts’ power over federal causes of
action for the narrow purpose of addressing these deficiencies with
state courts. This was not a license to create procedural common law
to serve other federal interests.
No one has ever suggested that federal courts entertaining federal causes of action are bound by the twin aims in this manner. Why
not? The reason must be that everyone assumes that Congress did not
consider state courts as the presumptive fora for federal causes of
action. Instead, it conceived of federal courts’ relationship to federal
causes of action as analogous to the relationship that state courts have
to state causes of action. Federal courts do not entertain federal
causes of action solely to avoid incompetent, hostile, or disuniform
interpretation of federal law by state courts. They have a more fundamental entitlement to entertain actions under federal law, an entitlement that carries with it the power to create procedure to vindicate
any legitimate federal interest.
The idea that federal courts are not subsidiary fora for federal
causes of action is arguably evident in the ratification debates. As
Madison noted, no one was uncomfortable about federal question
jurisdiction: “With respect to the laws of the Union, it is so necessary
and expedient that the judicial power should correspond with the leg187 Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312
(2005); Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 826–28 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Donald L. Doernberg, There’s No Reason for It; It’s Just Our Policy:
Why the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule Sabotages the Purpose of Federal Question Jurisdiction, 38
HASTINGS L.J. 597, 647 (1987); John F. Preis, Reassessing the Purposes of Federal Question
Jurisdiction, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 247, 248–49 (2007).
188 Of course, given that the Conformity Act was in place at the time, Act of June
1, 1872, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 196, this obligation would have been largely pleonastic.
But it would have meant something when the Conformity Act was repealed by the
Rules Enabling Act, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934).
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islative, that it has not been objected to.”189 William R. Davie
expressed the same view: “I thought, if there were any political axiom
under the sun, it must be, that the judicial power ought to be coextensive with the legislative. The federal government ought to possess the
means of carrying the laws into execution.”190 Granted, these statements might be understood as expressing the view that federal question jurisdiction exists for a narrow purpose only, namely to enforce
the supremacy of federal law against unwilling states. So understood,
federal courts’ power over procedure might be limited by this purpose. But there appears to be a more basic notion at work, one tied to
the idea that the judicial power should be coextensive with the legislative. A court has a fundamental entitlement to apply the law of its own
sovereign. Just as a Pennsylvania court is entitled to entertain Pennsylvania causes of action, a federal court is entitled to entertain federal
causes of action. This is a reason to give federal courts jurisdiction
over federal causes of action even if state courts interpreted and
enforced federal law ably, willingly, and with perfect uniformity. It
follows from this entitlement that a federal court entertaining a federal cause of action should have the power to create procedural law to
effectuate any forum purpose, just as state courts do when entertaining actions under their own law.
Of course, the force of this entitlement should not be exaggerated, for federal question jurisdiction did not generally exist in the
lower federal courts for almost a century. As we shall see, this is some
evidence that state and federal courts were conceived of as coequal fora
for federal causes of action. But it is not likely that when Congress
created federal question jurisdiction in 1875, it conceived of federal
courts as subsidiary to state courts. It intended federal courts to have
procedural power unrestricted by the twin aims.

189 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 532 (Jonathan Elliot ed., J.B. Lippincott Co. 1941) (1836)
[hereinafter DEBATES]. For a detailed discussion of the ratification debates concerning Article III arising under jurisdiction, see Anthony J. Bellia Jr., The Origins of Article
III “Arising Under” Jurisdiction, 57 DUKE L.J. 263, 304–17 (2007). Bellia emphasizes the
importance of arising under jurisdiction as a means of enforcing the supremacy of
federal law.
190 4 id. at 158; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 80 (Alexander Hamilton) (“If there
are such things as political axioms, the propriety of the judicial power of a government being coextensive with its legislative may be ranked among the number.”). For
a recent expression of the presumption in favor of federal jurisdiction for federal
causes of action, see Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 132 S. Ct. 740, 748–49 (2012).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-4\NDL403.txt

2013]

unknown

the twin aims of

Seq: 45

ERIE

22-MAY-13

9:22

1909

2. Reverse-Erie
Having come to the conclusion that everyone has assumed—that
the twin aims do not bind a federal court entertaining a federal cause
of action—we must now address the more difficult question of
whether they bind a state court entertaining a federal cause of action.
This requires us to consider the purposes for which Congress retained
concurrent state court jurisdiction for federal causes of action.
Arguments for a reverse-twin aims approach, under which state
courts borrow federal procedure, are based on the notion that federal
courts are the presumptive fora for federal causes of action, and state
court jurisdiction is derivative—existing to overcome some deficiency
with exclusive federal jurisdiction. Tasked with accepting jurisdiction
to satisfy this purpose, state courts are obligated to regulate their procedure accordingly.
Assume, for example, that Congress understood federal courts as
the presumptive fora for federal causes of action, but retained concurrent state court jurisdiction to keep the federal docket from being
overwhelmed or because it wanted to protect some interest of the parties in having a choice between a state and federal forum for their
federal dispute. Given these purposes, state courts would have an
obligation to borrow federal procedure. If there were a significant
difference between state and federal procedure, forum shopping
would frustrate the federal purposes standing behind the grant of
concurrent state court jurisdiction. For example, if Congress gave
state courts jurisdiction over federal actions to relieve pressure on the
federal docket, procedural disuniformity would frustrate this purpose
because parties disfavored by state procedure would choose the federal forum, flooding the federal courts. Or if Congress gave state
courts jurisdiction to protect the parties’ discretion to choose between
a federal and state court, a difference between federal and state procedure would restrict this freedom of choice.
What is more, even if forum shopping is set aside, the second of
the twin aims would apply. We are assuming that Congress gave state
courts jurisdiction over federal causes of action solely to address a
problem with the presumptive federal forum. It would not follow
from this limited grant of jurisdiction that state courts had the procedural power they have when entertaining causes of action under their
own or sister state law.
But a very different theory of state court jurisdiction for federal
actions is possible. Congress may have retained such jurisdiction, not
to solve a particular problem with exclusive jurisdiction in the presumptive federal forum, but because it conceived of state courts as
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having the same entitlement to entertain federal actions that they
have to entertain actions under their own or sister state law. Under
this equality approach, the twin aims would not bind state courts. State
and federal courts entertaining federal causes of action would each be
free to create procedural law to satisfy forum purposes, no matter how
much vertical disuniformity might result. It would not matter, for
example, that a state had procedural rules that discouraged parties
from suing on federal causes of action in the state’s courts, for the
failure of the parties to seek out state jurisdiction would frustrate no
federal jurisdictional purpose. The state’s procedural rule would be
acceptable, despite this forum shopping, as long as its purpose was
neutral concerning federal and state causes of action. States could
not, of course, create procedural rules that had as their goal discrimination against federal law.191
So which is correct, the equality or reverse-twin aims approach?
We cannot answer the question by reference to the legislative history
of the Judiciary Act of 1875, which is silent on this, and pretty much
every other, matter.192 But the notion that state courts have a fundamental entitlement to entertain federal causes of action is plausible,
and there is some evidence for such a reading in the ratification
debates.193 Hamilton argued, for example, that Article III’s grant of
federal judicial power over actions arising under federal law did not
divest state courts of their preexisting power to entertain such actions.
To be sure, federal causes of action did not preexist Article III.194
But, he noted, prior to Article III a New York state court had the
power to “lay[ ] hold of all subjects of litigation between parties within
its jurisdiction, though the causes of dispute are relative to the laws of
the most distant parts of the globe. Those of Japan, not less than of
New York, may furnish the objects of legal discussion to our courts.”195
New York state courts had an entitlement to entertain causes of action
under any sovereign’s law—including the law of a sovereign, like the
United States, that had yet to come into being.
To the extent that Congress retained state court jurisdiction for
federal actions in recognition of this state entitlement, rather than to
overcome some deficiency with exclusive jurisdiction in federal courts,
it would have allowed state courts to retain plenary power over proce191 See supra note 149.
192 See supra note 186.
193 4 DEBATES, supra note 189, at 141 (comments of Governor Johnston).
194 THE FEDERALIST No. 82 (Alexander Hamilton) (“But this doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction, is only clearly applicable to those descriptions of causes, of which
the State courts have previous cognizance.”).
195 Id.

R
R
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dure.196 A New York state court entertaining a federal cause of action
should have the same procedural power that it has when entertaining
a Pennsylvania or Japanese cause of action.197
Of course, it is within Congress’s authority to override state
courts’ entitlement to entertain federal actions. It can create exclusive federal subject matter jurisdiction.198 And it can choose to retain
state court jurisdiction over federal actions solely to address a problem
with federal jurisdiction—for example, to release the pressure on the
federal docket or to protect the parties’ freedom of choice between
state and federal court. If so, the twin aims would apply to state
courts. The question is solely one of discerning congressional intent.
But the fact that state courts were generally the sole fora for federal
causes of action until 1875 makes it unlikely that the creation of federal question jurisdiction suddenly made state courts subsidiary to federal courts. Jurisdiction in state court was probably retained to give
state courts the opportunity to exercise their preexisting entitlement
to entertain federal actions. Given this purpose, the equality
approach, under which the twin aims do not apply, would follow.199
If, as I believe, the twin aims are inapplicable to state courts, this
makes a big difference to reverse-Erie cases. Many of these cases have
been wrongly decided.
In determining the role of the twin aims in reverse-Erie cases, it is
important to distinguish between a state court being obligated to use a
federal rule because of the federal jurisdictional purposes expressed
in the twin aims and because the federal rule is bound up with the
federal action, in the sense that the failure to apply the federal rule
196 For a similar theory of state court jurisdiction for federal causes of actions, see
Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Congressional Power and State Court Jurisdiction, 94 GEO. L.J. 949,
969–72 (2006).
197 Indeed, the entitlement with respect to federal causes of action is probably
stronger, because state courts are arguably coequal interpreters of federal law with the
lower federal courts, in the sense that they have no duty to abide by the latters’ interpretations. See Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 376 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“The Supremacy Clause demands that state law yield to federal law, but neither
federal supremacy nor any other principle of federal law requires that a state court’s
interpretation of federal law give way to a (lower) federal court’s interpretation.”);
Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., State Courts and the Making of Federal Common Law, 153 U. PA. L.
REV. 825, 839 (2005).
198 E.g., Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1001–1461.
199 For a similar account of the equality approach, see Bellia, supra note 145, at
980. Bellia argues that the equality approach is exemplified in the Supreme Court’s
current reverse-Erie jurisprudence. Id. at 983–85. I disagree, for I see the effect of the
twin aims.
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will frustrate the action’s substantive regulatory purposes. This is the
reverse-Erie equivalent of the distinction between a federal court
being obligated to use a state procedural rule because of the twin aims
and because it is bound up with the state law cause of action in the
manner discussed in Byrd.
Of course, distinguishing between the two in a reverse-Erie context isn’t easy, because the Supreme Court is the final arbiter concerning both. In diversity cases, in contrast, the state supreme court has
the final say on whether a state rule is bound up with the state’s cause
of action, and the Supreme Court is the final authority on the effect of
the twin aims.
Nevertheless, I think the two types of federal interest—the first
driven by jurisdictional purposes tied to the grant of concurrent jurisdiction to state courts and the second driven by the substantive regulatory purposes of the federal law under which the plaintiff sues—can
be distinguished. In deciding which is implicated, it is helpful to consider the scope of the federal cause of action if it were entertained by
the courts of a foreign nation, to which federal jurisdictional interests
could not extend.
Consider Central Vermont Railway Co. v. White,200 in which the
Supreme Court held that a federal rule under which the burden of
proving contributory negligence is on the defendant should be used
by a state court entertaining an action under FELA. This is probably
an example of a federal substantive interest, in which failure to use
the federal rule would frustrate the purpose of the federal cause of
action. State courts entertaining causes of action under sister state law
generally use the sister state’s rule concerning the burden of proof,
on the theory that sister state officials consider the rule sufficiently
important to follow sister state causes of action into other court systems.201 Thus it is plausible that the Supreme Court, if asked, would
hold that the federal rule concerning the burden of proof follows
FELA actions into the courts of foreign nations.
With the distinction between federal jurisdictional and substantive interests in mind, it does not look, at first glance, as if the twin
aims play a role in reverse-Erie cases.202 The usual reason the
Supreme Court gives for state courts’ duty to apply a federal rule
200 Cent. Vt. Ry. Co. v. White, 238 U.S. 507, 512 (1915).
201 See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 595 (1934); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 133, cmt. b (1969).
202 For such an account of reverse-Erie cases, see Bellia, supra note 145, at 959–63,
976–85. The account that I offer here is closer to Kevin M. Clermont, Reverse-Erie, 82
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 36–37 (2006), which sees vertical uniformity having played a
role in the Supreme Court’s reverse-Erie jurisprudence.
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when entertaining a federal cause of action is that the rule is bound
up with the action, in the sense that the failure to apply the rule will
frustrate the action’s substantive purposes.203
An example is Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Burnette,204 in
which the Supreme Court held that a state court entertaining a FELA
action was bound to use FELA’s limitations period rather than the
forum state’s longer period.205 In favor of its conclusion, the Court
cited Davis v. Mills,206 which adopted the choice-of-law rule that
another sovereign’s statute of limitations should be respected by the
forum if the limitations period is part of the cause of action upon
which the plaintiff sues.207 This strongly suggests that the Court
understood FELA’s statute of limitations to be folded into FELA
actions, following such actions into other court systems. So understood, the FELA statute of limitations would follow FELA actions even
into the courts of other nations.208
Two other examples are Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown Railroad Co.,209 and Brown v. Western Railway of Alabama.210 In Dice, the
Court held that a state court entertaining a FELA action was bound to
use the federal rule, giving an issue to the jury, on the grounds that
the right to trial by jury was “too substantial a part of the rights
accorded by the Act to permit it to be classified as a mere ‘local rule of
procedure.’”211 And in Brown, it held that a Georgia rule that construed allegations against the pleader would “impose unnecessary burdens upon rights of recovery authorized by federal laws.”212 The
“federal right,” it argued, “cannot be defeated by the forms of local
practice.”213
The notion that federal rules must apply in state court because
they are bound up with the federal law under which the plaintiff sues
can also be found in more recent cases, such as Felder v. Casey.214 In
203 Engel v. Davenport, 271 U.S. 33, 38 (1926) (“This provision is one of substantive right, setting a limit to the existence of the obligation which the Act creates.”);
Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138 (1988).
204 Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Burnette, 239 U.S. 199 (1915).
205 Id. at 201.
206 Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451 (1904).
207 Id. at 454.
208 I am not saying, however, that the foreign nation’s court would be obligated to
prefer the federal limitations period over its own procedural law.
209 Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R. Co., 342 U.S. 359 (1952).
210 Brown v. W. Ry. of Ala., 338 U.S. 294 (1949).
211 Dice, 342 U.S. at 363.
212 Brown, 338 U.S. at 298.
213 Id. at 296.
214 Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-4\NDL403.txt

1914

unknown

Seq: 50

notre dame law review

22-MAY-13

9:22

[vol. 88:4

Felder, the Court held that a federal civil rights action brought in state
court in Wisconsin could not be dismissed because of a failure to comply with Wisconsin’s notice-of-claim statute.215 Once again, the Court
appealed primarily to interference with the regulatory interests standing behind federal civil rights laws.216 Thus, it argued that Wisconsin’s statute “so interferes with and frustrates the substantive right
Congress created that, under the Supremacy Clause, it must yield to
the federal interest.”217 This suggests that had the plaintiff sued the
defendant for violation of federal civil rights in the court of another
nation, the foreign court’s application of a notice-of-claim statute
would also be impermissible (by American lights).
I think it is clear, however, that in many reverse-Erie cases—
including some of those discussed above—the Supreme Court has
misdescribed why it thinks state courts should use federal rules. The
real reason is the twin aims.218 Consider, for example, Engel v. Davenport,219 in which the Supreme Court held that a state court was obligated to use the federal statute of limitations for FELA, instead of the
state’s shorter limitations period, on the ground that the federal limitations period “is one of substantive right, setting a limit to the existence
of the obligation which the Act creates.”220 From a horizontal choiceof-law perspective, this sounds odd. Even when a sister state’s statute
of limitations is substantive, the forum is usually thought to be permitted to apply its own shorter period,221 on the ground that the dismissal is without prejudice. The plaintiff is free to sue elsewhere.222 The
dismissal does not affect the right, only the ability to get a remedy
within that forum.
It is puzzling, therefore, for the Court to hold that it is a substantive part of a FELA action that a state court take jurisdiction of the
action, rather than dismissing it without prejudice. In what sense are
the purposes of FELA frustrated by the fact that the action proceeds
elsewhere (say, in federal court)? It seems much more likely that reason for the Court’s conclusion is the twin aims. Federal interests tied
to the grant of concurrent jurisdiction to state courts, not the regulatory purposes of FELA, are at issue. The state court is understood as
215 Id. at 138.
216 See id.
217 Id. at 151.
218 See Clermont, supra note 202, at 36–37.
219 Engel v. Davenport, 271 U.S. 33 (1926).
220 Id. at 38.
221 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 603, 605 (1934).
222 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 19(f) (1982); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 110 cmt. b (1971).
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obligated to take the FELA action when a federal court would. It cannot have procedural law that would substantially affect the choice of a
federal or state forum. This explains why courts entertaining reverseErie cases occasionally speak of a “desirable uniformity in adjudication
of federally created rights”223 and “the federal interest in
uniformity.”224
The same point applies to Felder. In her dissent, Justice
O’Connor rightly argued that Wisconsin’s notice-of-claim statute did
not burden the plaintiff’s federal right, for he could have chosen a
federal forum, where the statute would not have applied.225 Indeed,
under Wisconsin law dismissals for failure to satisfy the statute are
without preclusive effect.226 The plaintiff was still free to sue again in
federal court.
Because she believed that Wisconsin’s statute did not frustrate the
regulatory purposes of federal civil rights law, Justice O’Connor could
not see why the statute should be preempted.227 In short, she
adopted the equality approach—in which federal and state courts are
considered coequal fora for the litigation of federal causes of action.
Just as federal courts entertaining federal causes of action are not
restricted in the purposes for which they may create procedural common law, state courts (and legislatures) are not restricted in the purposes for which they may create procedural law for their courts, even
when these courts are entertaining federal actions. States’ only duty
when creating procedural law is to respect the substantive content of
the federal action itself and to not have procedural rules that single
out federal causes of action for disfavorable treatment.228
In contrast, the majority in Felder—although speaking of state
courts’ duty not to create procedural law that “interferes with and
frustrates the substantive right Congress created”229—really adopted
the reverse-twin aims approach, according to which state courts’ uniformity with federal procedure is important even when the regulatory
223 Brown v. W. Ry. of Ala., 338 U.S. 294, 299 (1949).
224 Shaw v. Leatherberry, 706 N.W.2d 299, 310 (Wis. 2005); see also Clermont,
supra note 202, at 36–37. As Clermont notes, the problem of disuniformity is not
merely vertical, between the federal and forum state court, but also horizontal: states
will apply their different procedures to the same federal cause of action.
225 Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 160–61 (1988) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
226 Patzer v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 763 F.2d 851, 855 (7th Cir. 1985).
227 Felder, 487 U.S. at 160.
228 For a classic critique of the Supreme Court’s aggressive reverse-Erie jurisprudence made from the perspective of the equality approach, see Hart, supra note 116,
at 508.
229 Felder, 487 U.S. at 151.
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purposes of the federal cause of action are not frustrated.230 States
must create procedural law in a manner limited by the twin aims.231
The battle between the equality and the reverse-twin aims
approaches can be seen in the most recent reverse-Erie case: Haywood
v. Drown.232 Haywood concerned a New York statute according to
which any civil action for damages against prison personnel for torts
committed within the scope of their employment had to be brought
in the New York Court of Claims.233 Because this court could not
entertain federal civil rights suits, the effect of the statute would be to
remove state court jurisdiction for federal civil rights suits brought
against prison personnel. A majority of the Court held that the New
York statute was preempted.234
Justice Thomas’s dissent exemplified the equality approach. The
New York statute, he argued, would not frustrate the federal right, for
the plaintiff would remain free to sue in federal court.235 He therefore saw no reason that the New York statute should be preempted.
New York was free to create procedural rules on the basis of New York
interests, so long as these rules did not have as their purpose discrimination against federal law,236 and the substantive purposes of federal
actions were not undermined.
I do not want to suggest that it is beyond Congress’s power to
command state courts to take jurisdiction of federal causes of action,
state rules on the matter notwithstanding. It is even within Congress’s
power to preempt state procedure for such actions, to the extent that
they diverge from the procedure that would be used by federal courts.
The question is solely one of discerning congressional intent. But I
think that Thomas was probably right: Congress, in giving state courts
230 Id.
231 Unless, perhaps, countervailing state interests are sufficiently substantial. Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911 (1997), appears to be a case in which the decision would
be the same under either the equality or the reverse-twin aims approach, due to the
strength of countervailing state interests. In Johnson, the Supreme Court unanimously
held that Idaho state courts entertaining federal civil rights actions were not required
to provide interlocutory appeals of denials of qualified immunity, although that was
the practice in federal courts. Id. at 922–23.
232 Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729 (2009).
233 Id. at 732; see N.Y. CORRECT. LAW. § 24 (McKinney 2003).
234 Haywood, 556 U.S. at 740.
235 Id. at 766 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
236 See supra note 149. The majority in Haywood also concluded that the New York
statute, although facially neutral, did indeed discriminate against federal civil rights
actions. 556 U.S. at 736–37. My critique of Haywood is not directed to this part of the
opinion.
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concurrent jurisdiction for federal civil rights actions,237 did not
intend that the twin aims apply there.
B. State Causes of Action in Federal Court
Let us now move on to whether the twin aims apply to federal
courts entertaining state law actions under jurisdictional statutes other
than 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). I will begin with a general argument that
the twin aims should be used whenever a federal court entertains an
action under state law, no matter what the source of jurisdiction.
Consider, once again, why the twin aims apply in diversity. A federal court sitting in diversity was understood by Congress as a subsidiary forum in the state in order to address a particular deficiency with
the state’s courts, namely bias against non-domiciliaries. Procedural
uniformity with forum state courts fosters this purpose by ensuring
that disadvantageous federal procedure does not discourage those
worried about state court bias from seeking a federal forum, and that
those who are not worried about state court bias do not waste federal
judicial resources by choosing a federal forum because of its advantageous procedure.
But even if there were no possibility of forum shopping, for example, if diversity cases had exclusive federal jurisdiction, the fact that
federal courts were understood by Congress as subsidiary fora means
that any federal procedural common law that significantly deviates
from the procedure of the forum state still needs substantial justification. Congress did not give federal courts jurisdiction over diversity
actions to come up with federal procedural common law to satisfy any
conceivable federal interest.
It is highly probable that all other forms of federal jurisdiction for
state law actions are, like diversity, created by Congress to address particular deficiencies with the presumptive state fora. Congress creates
federal jurisdiction for state law actions for reasons, and these reasons
must be that something about state court jurisdiction is inadequate.
Given this fact, the power of federal courts to create procedural common law that deviates from the presumptive state fora must be justified by the purposes for which federal jurisdiction was created, or
other countervailing federal interests of sufficient strength.
I am not suggesting that it is impossible for Congress to give to
federal courts entertaining state law actions the plenary power over
procedure that state courts have when entertaining their own or sister
237 Patsy v. Bd. of Regents of Fla., 457 U.S. 496, 506–507 (1982).
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state actions.238 But in the absence of evidence that this was Congress’s intent, a federal court entertaining a state law action should be
understood as a federal extension of a state court system. Thus, any
deviation from the procedure that would be used in that state’s courts
needs a substantial justification. Notice that the purpose of this justification is not to overcome the state’s interest in extending its procedural laws to federal courts. The federal court’s subsidiary role is
imposed by Congress, not a state.
238 A possible candidate is the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), which
provides federal jurisdiction over large state law nationwide class actions in which
there is minimal diversity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). Some have argued that CAFA
gives federal courts the power to create federal substantive common law. Suzanna
Sherry, Overruling Erie: Nationwide Class Actions and National Common Law, 156 U. PA.
L. REV. 2135, 2136–36 (2008). Our question, however, is whether the twin aims apply
to a federal court entertaining a state law action under CAFA. The legislative history
in CAFA disavows any attempt to change federal courts’ obligations under Erie. See S.
REP. NO. 109-14, at 49 (2005); H.R. REP. NO. 108-144, at 26 (2003). But it is likely that
what was being referred to was federal courts’ Erie obligations to respect applicable
state law. It is not clear that the twin aims were being contemplated.
A number of scholars have argued that CAFA allows federal courts to use independent federal choice-of-law rules, rather than the choice-of-law rules of the state
where the federal court is located. See Samuel Issacharoff, Settled Expectations in a
World of Unsettled Law: Choice of Law After the Class Action Fairness Act, 106 COLUM. L.
REV. 1839, 1840 (2006); Linda Silberman, The Role of Choice of Law in National Class
Actions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 2001, 2002 (2008). I doubt, however, that they think the
twin aims do not apply at all in CAFA actions. They would not say, for example, that
federal courts have the power to apply an independent federal common law time
limit to state law actions in federal court under CAFA. CAFA is not a license to federal courts to effectuate any federal policy they might come up with in a class action
setting.
The argument that Klaxon does not apply in CAFA is probably based, not on the
view that the twin aims do not apply at all in CAFA cases, but on the view that Klaxon
is contrary to the particular purposes for which federal jurisdiction was created in
CAFA. CAFA was enacted because of distrust of the manner in which state courts
were handling nationwide class actions. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L.
No. 109-2, § 2(a)(4) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1711 (2006)); Burbank,
supra note 140, at 1950. According to this argument, CAFA overrides Klaxon because
state courts’ tendency to manipulate choice of law to aid certification was one of the
(alleged) abuses that CAFA was meant to address. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 26–27
(2005). Under such an argument, however, CAFA overrode Klaxon only with respect
to forum state choice-of-law rules that enhance the probability of certification. Burbank, supra note 140, at 1950–51. An example is a rule that subjects all the members
of the class to a single state’s law (such as the law of the defendant’s principal place of
business). E.g., Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs Local 68 Welfare Fund v. Merck &
Co., 894 A.2d 1136, 1153 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006). In other respects, Klaxon
would still apply. I cannot address the role in CAFA of Klaxon, and the twin aims
generally, further here, however.
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With this general argument in mind, let us turn to two specific
jurisdictional statutes, starting with supplemental jurisdiction.
1. Supplemental Jurisdiction
Do the twin aims apply to state law actions brought in federal
court under supplemental jurisdiction, as has been widely assumed?239
To repeat, if they are, the reason cannot be respect for state lawmaking power, for the twin aims are unconcerned about state interests.240
Assume a federal court in New York takes a Pennsylvania cause of
action under supplemental jurisdiction. If the twin aims apply, the
court should borrow New York’s statute of limitations, if that is what a
New York state court would use, even if New York has no interest in
extending its statute to federal courts within the state. Whether the
twin aims apply in supplemental jurisdiction must be answered, not by
looking to state interests, but by looking to the purposes of the supplemental jurisdiction statute.241
Let us begin with the purposes of supplemental jurisdiction in
diversity cases. Consider a Nevadan sued by a Californian for state law
negligence in California state court. Fearing state court bias, she
removes the action to federal court. In the absence of supplemental
jurisdiction, an impleader she has against a Nevadan who was a joint
tortfeasor in the accident will have to be litigated in state court. This
is inefficient, given that the evidence in the state and federal cases
would be largely the same. Indeed, faced with the costs of duplicative
litigation, she might fail to remove in the first place, despite her worries about bias.242 It is to address these problems that Congress created supplemental jurisdiction in diversity cases.243 Supplemental
jurisdiction is efficient and supports the underlying purposes of diversity jurisdiction.
239 See, e.g., Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 40 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79, 91–92 (1st Cir. 2010).
240 Federal courts usually argue mistakenly that the twin aims apply in supplemental jurisdiction due to respect for state law under Erie. See, e.g., A.I. Trade Fin., Inc. v.
Petra Int’l Banking Corp., 62 F.3d 1454, 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Terry v. June, 420 F.
Supp. 2d 493, 500 (W.D. Va. 2006).
241 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2006).
242 Robert A. Schapiro, Polyphonic Federalism: State Constitutions in the Federal Courts,
87 CAL. L. REV. 1409, 1422 (1999).
243 United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966); Miller Aviation v. Milwaukee Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 273 F.3d 722, 731–32 (7th Cir. 2001);
Richard D. Freer, Compounding Confusion and Hampering Diversity: Life After Finley and
the Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute, 40 EMORY L.J. 445, 449 (1991).
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It follows from these purposes that the twin aims should apply to
the impleader. With supplemental jurisdiction in place, it is likely
that the negligence action and the impleader will be litigated together
in federal or state court. Given this fact, the twin aims must apply to
both actions in federal court or the purposes of diversity jurisdiction
will be frustrated. Assume that the federal court applied a uniform
federal common law limitations period to the impleader. If this
period is shorter than that used by a California state court, the
Nevadan might refrain from removing the negligence action to keep
the impleader from being dismissed as time barred, despite her worries about state court bias concerning the negligence action. And if
the federal common law period were longer, she might remove the
negligence action, even though she had no worry about state court
bias, in order to take advantage of the longer period for the
impleader.244 To ensure that her choice of a federal forum for the
negligence action is made for the right reason, procedural uniformity
between federal and forum state court for both actions is required.
Furthermore, even if concerns about forum shopping are set
aside, the second of the twin aims would apply to the impleader just as
much as the negligence action. The California state court remains
the presumptive forum for both actions. Congress granted supplemental jurisdiction to the impleader to overcome the inefficiency of
separate litigation and because it supported the purposes of diversity
jurisdiction. There is no reason to think that this was a license to federal courts create procedural common law for the impleader to vindicate any conceivable federal interest. If the federal court created a
short federal common law limitations period for the impleader as a
means of weeding out actions with stale evidence, the Nevada defendant could argue that she was being treated unfairly, for the federal
court would have deviated from the rules of the presumptive state
forum in a manner that was not justified by the purposes of supplemental jurisdiction or by countervailing federal interests of sufficient
strength.
Now let us consider the twin aims for supplemental jurisdiction
actions in federal question cases. Here too the justification for supplemental jurisdiction is efficiency. Assume a California plaintiff sues a
California officer in federal court in California because his arrest violated his federal civil rights. In the absence of supplemental jurisdiction, he would have to sue the officer for state law battery concerning
the arrest in state court, even though the evidence presented in both
actions will be largely the same.
244

See Westen & Lehman, supra note 27, at 385–87.
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Once again, it follows that the twin aims should apply to the battery action. The justification for the twin aims is particular strong if
my argument in Part III.A.2 is faulty and the twin aims apply in a
reverse-Erie context. Assume Congress wants vertical procedural uniformity in federal question cases, to avoid forum shopping. A California state court entertaining the federal civil rights action must borrow
federal procedural law to ensure that the parties are not discouraged
or overly encouraged from litigating there. But since the civil rights
action and battery action will litigated together,245 avoiding forum
shopping is possible only if there is vertical procedural uniformity
concerning the battery action too. Otherwise a party might avoid, or
unjustifiably seek out, state court jurisdiction for the federal civil
rights action because of the procedure that would be applied to the
battery action. Concerning the battery action, however, the duty of
ensuring procedural uniformity would fall on federal rather than state
courts.
But assume, as I have argued, that forum shopping is not a concern with federal causes of action. The second of the twin aims still
applies. Congress gave the battery action supplemental jurisdiction to
avoid the inefficiency that would occur if it were litigated separately,
not because it conceived of the federal court as a coequal forum for
the action. If the federal court applied a short federal common law
limitations period to the battery action the plaintiff could legitimately
complain that he was being treated unfairly, for the content of this
federal procedural common law rule would not be justified by the
purposes of supplemental jurisdiction or by countervailing federal
interests of sufficient strength.246

245 Under the transactional standard for claim preclusion, joinder would be
required. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 (1982).
246 Cf. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 40 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The decision of an important legal issue should not turn on the accident of
diversity of citizenship . . . or the presence of a federal question unrelated to that
issue.” (citation omitted)). This is not to say that a uniform federal procedural common law rule can never be applied to a state law action with supplemental jurisdiction. But the reason must be that there are federal interests of sufficient strength to
overcome the twin aims. For example, as a practical matter it is necessary that the
same rule concerning the attorney-client privilege be applied to federal and state law
actions brought together before a federal court. Having been exposed to a piece of
evidence in connection with one cause of action, the finder of fact cannot help but
consider it in connection with the other. Thus, federal interests recommend using
the federal rule for both state and federal actions. See von Bulow ex rel. Auersperg v.
von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 141 (2d Cir. 1987). I thank Anthony Bellia for identifying
this issue.
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2. Bankruptcy
Finally, let us consider the thorny question of the twin aims in
bankruptcy jurisdiction. In certain areas, federal bankruptcy jurisdiction is exclusive.247 But bankruptcy jurisdiction over state law actions
is generally concurrent,248 and federal courts can abstain from hearing such actions in order to allow them to proceed in state court.249
Our question is whether the twin aims apply to state law actions that
are pursued in bankruptcy court. It should be noted that in my discussion I will speak of a “bankruptcy court” generally, ignoring the
difference—crucial in other contexts—between a bankruptcy court
and a federal district court sitting in bankruptcy.
Discussion of the twin aims in bankruptcy has been directed
almost entirely to the question of whether uniform federal choice-oflaw rules should be used by bankruptcy courts or whether, per Klaxon,
they should use the choice-of-law rules of the forum state. As we have
seen, the applicability of Klaxon in diversity cases was a product of the
twin aims. A uniform federal choice-of-law rule would “constantly disturb equal administration of justice in coordinate state and federal
courts sitting side by side.”250 Klaxon is unrelated to respect for state
lawmaking power under Erie, because a forum state’s choice-of-law
rules do not extend, and do not purport to extend, to federal
courts.251
It is worth emphasizing, however, that bankruptcy courts do have
an obligation under Erie to respect state lawmaking power.252 Assume
that choice of state law is not an issue, because only one state’s law
could, as a constitutional matter, be applied to the facts. Unless it has
been preempted by federal law, bankruptcy courts are required to
respect that state’s law,253 which includes respecting state procedural
247 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a), (e)(1) (2006).
248 Id. § 1334(b). There is also the possibility of supplemental jurisdiction for
state law actions in bankruptcy cases under § 1367. For a critical discussion, see Susan
Block-Lieb, The Case Against Supplemental Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: A Constitutional, Statutory, and Policy Analysis, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 721 (1994).
249 Id. § 1334(c). In some cases, abstention is mandatory. Id. § 1334(c)(2).
250 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941).
251 See supra text accompanying notes 112–116. For a discussion of alternative
views of Klaxon, see supra note 112 and infra note 275.
252 See, e.g., Alfred Hill, The Erie Doctrine in Bankruptcy, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1013
(1953); Thomas E. Plank, The Erie Doctrine and Bankruptcy, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
633, 643–48 (2004).
253 Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979); Plank, supra note 252, at
663–78.
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rules that are bound up with that law.254 The mere existence of bankruptcy jurisdiction does not mean that preemption has occurred. As
the Supreme Court put it in Butner v. United States, “Congress has generally left the determination of property rights in the assets of a bankrupt’s estate to state law. . . . Unless some federal interest requires a
different result, there is no reason why such interests should be analyzed differently simply because an interested party is involved in a
bankruptcy proceeding.”255 Bankruptcy courts’ Erie obligations also
apply in cases where more than one state’s law may constitutionally be
applied to a matter, for unless state law has been preempted they are
obligated to apply the law of one of those states.
Our question, however, is not Erie, but the twin aims. Does a
bankruptcy court entertaining a state law action have a reason to borrow the rules that would be applied by a forum state court, even when
these rules do not or cannot extend to federal court of their own
force? If the twin aims apply in bankruptcy, a bankruptcy court will
incorporate into federal procedural common law not merely the
forum state’s choice-of-law rules but many other rules that would be
used by a forum state court. It would have a reason to borrow such
rules, unless significant countervailing federal interests recommend a
uniform federal common law rule.
Federal courts’ treatment of the role of the twin aims in bankrupcty has been unsatisfactory. Consider In re Gaston & Snow,256 in
which the Second Circuit held that Klaxon controls in bankruptcy.
The reason, the court argued, was that state law cannot be preempted
by federal common law absent a compelling federal interest: “The
ability of the federal courts to create federal common law and displace
state created rules is severely limited. . . . Before federal courts create
federal common law, ‘a significant conflict between some federal policy or interest and the use of state law must first be specifically
shown.’”257
This wrongly treats the twin aims as if they are tied to Erie’s concern for the lawmaking power of the states. As we have seen, the twin
254 Raleigh ex rel. Estate of Stoecker v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 530 U.S. 15, 20 (2000)
(holding that a bankruptcy court must respect the state rule concerning burden of
proof for state law claims against a debtor).
255 Butner, 440 U.S. at 54–55; see also Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Pac. Gas & Elec.
Co., 549 U.S. 443, 450 (2007) (“the ‘basic federal rule’ in bankruptcy is that state law
governs the substance of claims” (quoting Raleigh, 530 U.S. at 20)).
256 In re Gaston & Snow, 243 F.3d 599 (2d Cir. 2001).
257 Id. at 606 (quoting Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 218 (1997)). In re Merritt
Dredging Co., 839 F.2d 203 (4th Cir. 1988), also treats the matter as linked to Erie and
respect for state law.
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aims are not about respect for state interests. They recommend incorporating state law standards into federal procedural common law to
vindicate federal jurisdictional interests, without regard for whether
the forum state supreme court would want its rule to extend to federal
courts. Since state law does not apply in federal court, it cannot be
displaced, whether or not a uniform federal common law rule is used.
Federal courts that have concluded that the twin aims and Klaxon
are irrelevant in bankruptcy have not done much better. In In re Lindsay,258 the Ninth Circuit held that Klaxon did not control because the
state law issue faced by the bankruptcy court arose in an area where
bankruptcy jurisdiction was exclusive. “In federal question cases with
exclusive jurisdiction in federal court,” the court reasoned, “the risk of
forum shopping which is avoided by applying state law has no application, because the case can only be litigated in federal court.”259
First of all, the very decision by the debtor about whether to
declare bankruptcy might be motivated in part by the federal procedural common law available in bankruptcy court.260 But more fundamentally, the second of the twin aims could still apply to bankruptcy
courts even if forum shopping is not a concern. We have already
come to this conclusion in connection with diversity.261 If federal
courts had exclusive jurisdiction over diversity cases, it would not follow that they could create a short common law time limit for state laws
actions to address problems of stale evidence. Those disadvantaged
by the time limit could still legitimately complain that federal courts
were inequitably administering the laws. By creating diversity jurisdiction, Congress meant to provide a forum in each state free of prodomiciliary bias—not to empower federal courts to create procedural
common law to serve any conceivable federal interest.
The same point appears to be true of bankruptcy. Like diversity
jurisdiction, federal bankruptcy jurisdiction was created as an alternative to the presumptive state fora in order to address a deficiency in
state court jurisdiction. In the case of bankruptcy jurisdiction, the
deficiency is a collective action problem. Each creditor would prefer
to be the first to bring an independent state court action against the
debtor, in order to get relief before the debtor’s assets are exhausted.
258 In re Lindsay, 59 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 1995). The question of state law at issue in
Lindsay was tied to the whether a conveyance by the debtor was fraudulent under 11
U.S.C. § 548.
259 In re Lindsay, 59 F.3d at 948.
260 See Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply
to Warren, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 815, 824–28 (1987); John T. Cross, State Choice of Law
Rules in Bankruptcy, 42 OKLA. L. REV. 531, 526–29 (1989).
261 See supra Part II.B.2.
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To allow for an efficient and equitable distribution of these assets—
and to protect the debtor herself—it is crucial that all litigation by and
against the debtor be controlled by one court.262 Congress, in creating bankruptcy jurisdiction, intended to solve this problem with state
court jurisdiction. It is unlikely that it thereby licensed federal courts
to create procedural common law to serve unrelated federal purposes.
If federal bankruptcy policies or other sufficiently strong countervailing federal interests do not recommend otherwise, federal courts
lack a sufficient reason to deviate from the rules that would be used by
the courts of the state where the action would have been brought
absent bankruptcy jurisdiction.263
But there is a complication in bankruptcy that makes it difficult
to satisfy the twin aims’ demands. Bankruptcy proceedings will generally be brought in the district of the debtor’s residence (for an individual) or state of incorporation, principal place of business, or location
of assets (for a business).264 The bankruptcy court in that district will
have jurisdiction over all of the debtor’s property, no matter where it
is located, and nationwide service of process is available.265 Thus, it
can entertain a state law action even though the action could not have
been entertained by a forum state court.
An example is In re Gaston & Snow.266 The Boston law firm of
Gaston & Snow entered involuntary bankruptcy proceedings in the
Southern District of New York, where it had a branch office. The
bankruptcy estate administrator filed an adversary proceeding against
Robert Erkins, a resident of Idaho, to recover $1.7 million for legal
services performed for Erkins by lawyers at Gaston & Snow’s Boston
office. The Second Circuit held that the relevant limitations period
should be six years, because that is what would be applied by a New
York state court, even though no action against Erkins could have
been brought in state court in New York.267
262 In re Xonics, Inc., 813 F.2d 127, 131 (7th Cir. 1987); see also Block-Lieb, supra
note 248, at 811–14.
263 See Cross, supra note 260, at 576–78.
264 See 28 U.S.C. § 1408 (2006). But see 28 U.S.C. § 1409 (limiting venue for
actions by trustee of small value to district where defendant resides). These restrictions still leave significant discretion in choosing a venue, particularly when the
debtor is a business. On horizontal forum shopping in Chapter 11 bankruptcy, see
Theodore Eisenberg & Lynn M. LoPucki, Shopping for Judges: An Empirical Analysis of
Venue Choice in Large Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 967 (1999).
265 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e)(1) (2006); FED. R. BANKR. P. 7004(d) (2010).
266 In re Gaston & Snow, 243 F.3d 599 (2d Cir. 2001).
267 A complicating factor is that under New York law, the six-year period was to be
used only if the plaintiff was a New York resident, and Gaston & Snow was not a
resident of New York within the meaning of the statute. But the argument that the
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As Gaston & Snow reveals, the twin aims cannot always be satisfied
by borrowing the rules that would be used by a forum state court. The
federal court entertaining the action against Erkins cannot be understood as subsidiary to New York state courts. If it is subsidiary to the
courts of a state, the relevant state is the one where the action would
have been brought had bankruptcy not been declared. But this state
is difficult to determine. Although it is likely to have been Idaho, it
might have been Massachusetts, where personal jurisdiction over
Erkins would also have been possible. Indeed, theoretically the court
of any state, including New York, might have entertained the action, if
the summons and complaint had been served upon Erkins within the
state’s borders,268 or Erkins had consented to personal jurisdiction,
and the court did not dismissed the action on forum non conveniens
grounds.
What effect should the broad personal jurisdictional scope of a
bankruptcy court have on the applicability of the twin aims? In considering the matter, it is best to begin with cases where there is a high
level of certainty about where the action would have proceeded
outside bankruptcy.
An example is when the state law action was filed pre-bankruptcy
and the bankruptcy court only subsequently got jurisdiction.269 In
such a case, the twin aims clearly recommend borrowing the rules that
would be used by the courts of the state where the action was originally filed, as long as those courts would not have dismissed for lack of
personal jurisdiction or forum non conveniens.270 After all, if the banksix-year period did not apply was not raised below and so was waived on appeal. Id. at
608.
268 See Burnham v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 495 U.S. 604 (1990) (holding this service to
be sufficient for personal jurisdiction).
269 The case might be transferred from one federal court to the district with jurisdiction over the bankruptcy case under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a) or 1412 or the practical
equivalent of transfer might occur by the filing of a proof of claim in the federal court
with jurisdiction over the bankruptcy case. See In re Coudert Bros. LLP, 673 F.3d 180,
182 (2d Cir. 2012). For an action filed in state court, removal to the federal court in
the district where the state court is located would precede transfer. 28 U.S.C. § 1452.
270 Coudert Bros., 673 F.3d at 185, 191 (holding that Connecticut limitations period
rather than New York’s period should be used for an action against the debtor, under
either Connecticut or United Kingdom law, originally filed in state court in Connecticut, but ultimately entertained by bankruptcy court in New York). Cf. Ferens v. John
Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516 (1990) (holding that federal courts sitting in diversity entertaining a state law action transferred from a federal court in another state should use
the transferor’s state’s choice-of-law rules); Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612
(1964).
Another example of the twin aims applying due to pre-bankruptcy filing of the
state law action is Nuveen Mun. Trust v. WithumSmith Brown, P.C., 692 F.3d 283 (3d Cir.
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ruptcy court used different procedural law than the filing state’s
courts, there would be a danger of vertical forum shopping. The
debtor might declare bankruptcy or avoid bankruptcy because of the
procedural common law used in bankruptcy court. Granted, declaring bankruptcy, unlike invoking diversity jurisdiction, is not generally
discretionary. But there are inevitably areas where the debtor has
some room for choice. Furthermore, even though the opportunities
to forum shop are narrower in bankruptcy than they are in diversity,
the costs of forum shopping are greater. If a defendant who is not
worried about state court bias removes a diversity case to federal
court, all that happens is that federal judicial resources are wasted on
a case unrelated to the purposes of diversity. If a debtor declares
bankruptcy to take advantage of federal procedure, in contrast, a
whole web of financial relations is disturbed. In addition, because the
bankruptcy court can abstain from taking jurisdiction of a previously
filed state law action, uniformity between the bankruptcy court’s procedure and the procedure in the court of the filing state can avoid
strategic decisions concerning requests for abstention.
But even when forum shopping is set aside, there is an argument
for procedural uniformity with the courts of the filing state. The filing
state’s courts are the presumptive fora for the state law action. Unless
the purposes of bankruptcy or other countervailing interests of sufficient force suggest otherwise, the bankruptcy court lacks a reason to
deviate from the rules that those courts would use.
There are other cases, besides those involving pre-bankruptcy filing, in which it is clear where the action would have been brought had
bankruptcy not occurred, namely when the parties are all residents of
a state and the transaction being litigated occurred there. In such
cases, the presumptive fora for the action are that state’s courts. Had
there been no bankruptcy jurisdiction the action would almost cer2012). A legal malpractice action was brought in federal court in New Jersey under
diversity, but dismissed because it failed to satisfy New Jersey’s Affidavit of Merit
(AOM) statute, which requires that a plaintiff in a professional malpractice action
provide an affidavit by an expert stating that there is evidence that the action has
merit. Federal courts sitting in diversity in New Jersey borrow the AOM statute due to
the twin aims. See Chamberlain v. Giampapa, 210 F.3d 154, 161 (3d Cir.2000). After
the Third Circuit remanded the case to reconsider the existence of diversity jurisdiction, the district court held that it had bankruptcy jurisdiction over the action. On a
second appeal, the Third Circuit concluded that the AOM statute still should be used,
despite the different jurisdictional source. This makes good sense, for the fact that
the plaintiff originally brought suit in federal court in New Jersey is strong evidence
that the action would have proceeded in New Jersey state court in the absence of
bankruptcy.
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tainly have been brought there.271 Here the twin aims recommend
that the federal procedural common law used by a bankruptcy court
borrow from the rules that would be used by the courts of that state.272
But as one moves beyond cases in which the action was filed prebankruptcy or the parties’ residence and the transaction at issue are
all located in one state, it becomes much more difficult to identify the
state where the action would have been brought absent bankruptcy.
Do the twin aims still apply in such cases?
First of all, I think it is clear that the second of the twin aims is no
longer relevant. The second aim applies in diversity cases because a
federal court is conceived of as subsidiary to the courts of the forum
state. This conception of a federal court can be meaningfully
extended to a bankruptcy court when it is clear in which state the state
law action would have been brought but for bankruptcy. But if all we
know is that the courts of a number of states would have entertained the
action in the absence of bankruptcy, the notion that a bankruptcy
court is an extension of a particular state court system evaporates.
The bankruptcy court is more analogous to a federal court sitting in
diversity in the District of Columbia, particularly before 1970, when
there was no “state” court system in the District parallel to “federal”
courts.273 Federal courts in the District were not understood as the
extension of any state court system, even though one might have
come up with a list of the states where the action would have been
brought had there been no jurisdiction in the District. Because federal courts in the District were not understood as the extension of a
state court system, they were free to apply federal procedural common
271 Granted, it is conceivable that a court in another state might have entertained
the action if the defendant has been served with the summons and complaint there
and the court did not dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds. We cannot be completely certain of the state where the action would have been brought had bankruptcy
not occurred. But the same lack of certainty arises in diversity cases, since it is always
possible that the plaintiff’s choice between federal and state court was diagonal—
between a federal court in one state and a state court in a different state. See supra
text accompanying notes 143–45. The twin aims are justified when the level of certainty about the presumptive state forum is sufficiently high and when a bankruptcy
court entertains a state law action where the parties and transaction are located in a
single state, the level of certainty is arguably as high as it would have been in a diversity case.
272 See In re Johnson, 453 B.R. 433 (Bankr. M.D.Fla. 2011) (holding, on the basis of
the twin aims, that a Florida statute forbidding a plaintiff to plead punitive damages
until he offers evidence showing a reasonable basis for that relief should be used by a
bankruptcy court in Florida entertaining an action under Florida law by bankruptcy
trustee on behalf of a Florida debtor against Florida defendant).
273 District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, title I,
Pub. L. No. 91-358, 84 Stat. 473, 475 (1970).
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law of their own devising to state law actions, without any duty to borrow from a state’s law, provided that state rules bound up with the
cause of action upon which the plaintiff sued were respected.274
One might argue, however, that the first of the twin aims is still
relevant and recommends that a bankruptcy court borrow a rule from
one of the states that could have entertained the action.275 Assume,
for example, that the courts of every state that could have entertained
the action would have used a three-year limitations period. There
would be a concern about forum shopping if the bankruptcy court
used a longer or shorter period. Furthermore, if half of the state
courts would have used a two-year period, and the other half a threeyear period, there would be a danger of forum shopping if the bankruptcy court chose a one-year or four-year period.
274 See Williams v. Rawlings Truck Line, Inc., 357 F.2d 581, 583–85 (D.C. Cir.
1965) (using federal common law choice-of-law rules when sitting in diversity, without
deference to any state’s rules); Tramontana v. S.A. Empresa De Viacao Aerea Rio
Grandense, 350 F.2d 468 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (same).
275 John Cross adopts such a position concerning choice-of-law rules. See Cross,
supra note 260, at 572–78. A bankruptcy court should use the choice-of-law rules that
would be used by the courts of one of the states that would have entertained the
action but for bankruptcy. Cross mistakenly justifies his approach, however, by appeal
to state interests. As he puts it, Klaxon follows from the Rules of Decision Act, because
“the choice of law rules of a state are part and parcel of the substantive rights afforded
litigants under the laws of that state.” Id. at 559. Although the personal jurisdictional
scope of a bankruptcy court removes the duty to use the forum state’s choice-of-law
rules, Klaxon and the Act still put a duty on the court to use the choice-of-law rules of
a state that could have gotten jurisdiction.
This reading of Klaxon and the Act is mistaken. Assume that only New York or
Pennsylvania law may be constitutionally applied to an event. A plaintiff sues concerning the event in diversity in federal court in Vermont. Under Klaxon, the federal
court should use Vermont’s choice-of-law rules. But Vermont’s choice-of-law rules
cannot possibly be understood as part and parcel of the substantive rights afforded
litigants under Vermont law. Vermont can create no substantive rights. Nor can Vermont’s choice-of-law rules be understood as part and parcel of the substantive rights
afforded litigants under New York or Pennsylvania law, since Vermont has no control
over those states’ laws. Cross’s mistake is precisely the one I argue against in this
Article—interpreting Klaxon, and the twin aims generally, in terms of states’ interests
in their rules applying in federal court.
Cross’s reading of Klaxon should be distinguished from Roosevelt’s. See supra
note 112. For Roosevelt, only certain choice-of-law rules are substantive, whereas for
Cross all apparently are. Furthermore, for Roosevelt it follows from Klaxon that a
federal court choosing between the laws of Pennsylvania and New York has a duty to
look to Pennsylvania’s substantive choice-of-law rules concerning the applicability of
Pennsylvania law and New York’s substantive choice-of-law rules concerning the applicability of New York law. His emphasis is on the choice-of-law rules of the state whose
law the federal court is considering applying, not the choice-of-law rules of the courts
of a state with jurisdiction.
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Although, as an abstract matter, this approach has some attractions, it is administratively difficult for a bankruptcy court to come up
with a list of those states where the action could have been brought
but for bankruptcy, especially since the list can be expanded significantly by including states that might get personal jurisdiction over the
defendant through in-state service or consent. Furthermore, even
when the candidate states and their rules are known and a rule is chosen from one of those states, if the candidate states’ rules differ from
one another, there is no assurance that forum shopping will not still
occur. Fearing a suit against him in a state with a three-year limitations period, the debtor might declare bankruptcy because he knows
the bankruptcy court will chose a candidate state with a two-year
period.
Because the second of the twin aims is irrelevant, the first is weakened, and the administrative costs are often high, I believe that in
general a bankruptcy court that is not certain about the particular
state where the action would have been brought outside bankruptcy
should be released from the twin aims’ demands.276 It is free to come
up with federal procedural common law rules for state law actions as it
sees fit, although it can, of course, borrow from forum state law or any
other state’s law for reasons of convenience, just as federal courts do
when federal statutes lack limitations periods.277 That said, if it is
administratively convenient and the procedural rule at issue is one—
such as a limitations period or a choice-of-law rule—that generates
serious forum shopping worries, bankruptcy courts would be advised
do their best to choose the rule that would be used by the courts of
one of the states where the action would most likely have been
brought in the absence of bankruptcy.
It is important to remember that the above discussion concerns
only the role of the twin aims in bankruptcy. Other elements of the
relatively unguided Erie analysis must still be addressed. For example,
276 I would recommend a similar solution for state law actions in federal court
under statutory interpleader, where nationwide service of process is also available. 28
U.S.C. § 1335(a)(1). See supra text accompanying notes 136–38. The Supreme Court
has mistakenly held that a federal court sitting in statutory interpleader should borrow from the forum state’s procedural law, even though a forum state court may not
have been able to get jurisdiction. See Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498, 503–06
(1941); see also Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y v. McKay, 837 F.2d 904, 905 (9th Cir.
1988); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Moore, 642 F.Supp. 1119, 1124 (C.D. Ill. 1986). Similar problems arise in cases in which a party was served pursuant to the “100-mile
bulge” provisions of FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(B), where federal courts have also borrowed forum state law even though a forum state court could not have gotten jurisdiction. See Sprow v. Hartford Ins. Co., 594 F.2d 412, 415–17 (5th Cir. 1979).
277 See supra text accompanying notes 31–34 and 182–184.
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even if the twin aims do not apply, a bankruptcy court can be limited
in its power to create procedural common law, because a state has
bound up a procedural rule with the cause of action.278 And even if
the twin aims do apply, countervailing federal interests can recommend a uniform federal procedural common law rule.
One unrecognized area where countervailing federal interests
should sometimes override the twin aims’ demands concerns statutes
of limitations. When a state court dismisses a state law action on statute of limitations grounds, the dismissal generally does not have claim
preclusive effect. The plaintiff is free to sue on that action in another
jurisdiction that has a longer period.279 The matter is different in
bankruptcy, where the federal court’s dismissal of the action is usually
fatal. The action cannot be brought again anywhere. This is a reason
for the bankruptcy court to choose the longer of the available periods,
unless a shorter period has been bound up into the cause of action
upon which the plaintiff sues.280
Finally, let us consider the role of Klaxon in bankruptcy.281 It follows from my argument above that when one is certain where the
278 See Raleigh ex rel. Estate of Stoecker v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 530 U.S. 15, 20–26
(2000) (holding that a bankruptcy court must respect state rule concerning burden of
proof for state law claim against debtor).
279 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 19 cmt. f; Rochelle Cooper
Dreyfuss & Linda J. Silberman, Interjurisdictional Implications of the Entire Controversy
Doctrine, 28 RUTGERS L.J. 123, 145–47 (1996).
280 Although no bankruptcy court, to my knowledge, has ever mentioned this concern, I do not think it is an accident that they tend to favor the longest of the limitations periods that would have been applied by the states that could have gotten
jurisdiction over the action. See In re Coudert Bros., 673 F.3d 180 (2012) (choosing
the longest period); In re Segre’s Iron Works, Inc., 258 B.R. 547 (Bankr. D. Conn.
2001) (same); In re SMEC, Inc., 160 B.R. 86, 89–91 (M.D. Tenn. 1993) (same); see also
In re Ovetsky, 100 B.R. 115 (Bankr. . N.D. Ga. 1989) (same). Indeed, even In re Gaston
& Snow, 243 F.3d 599 (2d Cir. 2001) follows this principle. The court rejected the
four-year limitations period of the state with the most significant relationship in favor
of the forum state’s six-year period. Although the action could not have been entertained by a forum state court, the federal court noted that another state where the
action could have been brought, Massachusetts, also had a six-year period. Id. at 608
n.7.
281 John Cross has argued against uniform federal choice-of-law rules in bankruptcy on the grounds that diverging from the choice-of-law rules that would be used
by a state court that had personal jurisdiction over the parties would frustrate the
reasonable expectations of the parties concerning which state law applied to their
transaction. See Cross, supra note 260, at 535. Such concerns about party expectations are misplaced. First of all, where personal jurisdiction may later be available
may not itself be able to be anticipated by the parties at the time of the transaction.
Second, federal choice-of-law rules are modeled on the Second Restatement. See In re
Vortex Fishing Sys., Inc., 277 F.3d 1057, 1069–70 (9th Cir. 2002); In re Lindsay, 59

R

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-4\NDL403.txt

1932

unknown

Seq: 68

notre dame law review

22-MAY-13

9:22

[vol. 88:4

action would have been brought outside of bankruptcy, for example,
because it was filed before bankruptcy was declared, the twin aims recommend that the bankruptcy court use the choice-of-law rules of that
state. On the other hand, if there is more than one state where the
action could have been brought, it is generally free of the twin aims’
demands and so can use federal choice-of-law rules.
But are there countervailing federal interests—in particular,
interests tied to the purposes of bankruptcy—that recommend a uniform federal choice-of-law approach even when the court knows
where the action would have been brought had bankruptcy not
occurred? Dicta from Justice Black’s opinion Vanston Bondholders Protective Community v. Green,282 suggests as much.283 Vanston concerned
whether a creditor had a claim against the debtor for interest on
unpaid interest.284 In the end, the Supreme Court held that bankruptcy policy preempted any state law right to such interest.285 But in
his opinion Black suggested that had the Court been required to
answer the horizontal choice-of-law question, the matter should have
been decided by federal choice-of-law rules, rather than rules borrowed from the forum state’s courts.286 Because the interests of a
number of states were involved, they would have to be balanced by the
federal court in a manner that did not look to the choice-of-law rules
of the forum state:
F.3d 942, 948 (9th Cir. 1995). The Second Restatement considers party expectations
when determining which state’s law to apply. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS
§6 (1971). Indeed, for federal courts in states that still use the First Restatement, it is
Klaxon that is more likely to frustrate the parties’ expectations, for the First Restatement generally decides what state’s law should be used on the basis of triggering
events, such as the place of the harm, that can fail to track the expectations of the
parties. See RESTATEMENT OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 377 (1934); Ala. G. S. R. v.
Carroll, 11 So. 803 (Ala. 1892) (applying Mississippi law to determine applicability of
the fellow-servant rule to wrongdoing of corporation’s employee in Alabama, because
harm from wrongdoing occurred in Mississippi). Third, worries about the parties’
reasonable expectations are not a serious concern in any case, because any choice-oflaw rule, whether federal or state, that clearly violated these expectations would be
unconstitutional under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments. See generally Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 326–31 (1981) (concerning Fourteenth Amendment Due Process limits in state court).
282 Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156 (1946).
283 Vanston has sometimes been relied upon by courts that favor federal choice-oflaw rules in bankruptcy. See, e.g., In re SMEC, Inc., 160 B.R. 86, 89–91 (M.D. Tenn.
1993); In re Kaiser Steel Corp., 87 B.R. 154, 158 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1988).
284 Vanston, 329 U.S. at 156.
285 Id. at 163.
286 Id. at 161–62.
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[O]bligations . . . often have significant contacts in many states, so
that the question of which particular state’s law should measure the
obligation seldom lends itself to simple solution. In determining
which contact is the most significant in a particular transaction,
courts can seldom find a complete solution in the mechanical formulae of the conflicts of law. Determination requires the exercise
of an informed judgment in the balancing of all the interests of the
states with the most significant contacts in order best to accommodate the equities among the parties to the policies of those states.287

For this reason, he argued, bankruptcy jurisdiction is not the same as
diversity jurisdiction: “In determining what claims are allowable and
how a debtor’s assets shall be distributed, a bankruptcy court does not
apply the law of the state where it sits. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins . . . has
no such implication.”288
Black’s argument is flawed. Bankruptcy jurisdiction is not the
only situation in which federal courts face competing state interests
when deciding questions of choice of law. This is true in diversity
cases too. And yet in diversity cases Klaxon demands that conflicts
between states’ interests be decided by the forum state’s rule. As we
have seen, Klaxon might keep federal courts from balancing state
interests properly.289 But using the forum state’s rule is nevertheless
required, because the Supreme Court concluded in Klaxon that resolving competing state interests equitably is not a purpose for which federal courts were given diversity jurisdiction.
The same considerations should apply in bankruptcy. It is true
that the choice-of-law problem faced by a bankruptcy court is not
merely that there are competing state interests with respect to a single
claim, but that there are competing claims against (and sometimes on
behalf of) the debtor. Concerning each claim a number of states may
have competing interests. But the fact that a bankruptcy court is reconciling competing state law claims is not, on its own, a reason to
abandon the view that it is subsidiary to state courts for the adjudication of those claims. The purposes of bankruptcy would in no way
have been frustrated had all state law claims first been litigated in state
courts, using their own choice-of-law rules, with the results then
presented to the bankruptcy court for reconciliation according to federal bankruptcy law. The only reason not to use Klaxon in bankruptcy
is that the state where the state law action would have been brought
absent bankruptcy is not known.
287
288
289

Id.
Id. at 162.
See supra text accompanying notes 110–116.
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Up to this point, I have been speaking of whether Klaxon applies
when a bankruptcy court entertains a state law cause of action brought
against or on behalf of the debtor. But in order to apply federal bankruptcy law, a bankruptcy court also has to face state law issues, such as
questions of the scope of the debtor’s estate,290 that are not tied to a
particular state law cause of action. Choice-of-law questions can arise
concerning these issues as well. With respect to these issues a federal
choice-of-law rule clearly should be used, for the court once again usually has no idea where they would have been litigated had bankruptcy
not occurred.291 Indeed, in many cases, the state law issue would have
never come up outside of bankruptcy.292 The twin aims are therefore
irrelevant.
To sum up, if the bankruptcy court is certain where the action
would have been brought but for bankruptcy, the twin aims recommend that the federal procedural common law it uses borrow from
the rules of that state. In other cases, the twin aims do not apply,
although if it is administratively convenient the bankruptcy court
would be advised to choose a rule that would be used by the courts of
one of the states where the action would most likely have been
brought in the absence of bankruptcy jurisdiction, as a means of discouraging forum shopping. Finally, whether or not the twin aims
apply, the bankruptcy court must also consider other factors of the
relatively unguided Erie analysis in coming to a conclusion about what
procedural rule to use.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have offered a comprehensive explanation of the
twin aims by grounding them, not in Erie concerns about federalism
290 See 11 U.S.C.A. § 541 (2006).
291 A number of writers have come to this conclusion. See, e.g., William Baude,
Beyond DOMA: Choice of State Law in Federal Statutes, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1411 (2012)
(addressing federal choice-of-law rules concerning validity of marriage in context of
bankruptcy); Jackie Gardina, The Perfect Storm: Bankruptcy, Choice of Law, and Same-Sex
Marriage, 86 B.U. L. REV. 881, 922–30 (2006) (same).
292 The question of the choice-of-law rules that should be used by a bankruptcy
court in connection with state law issues necessary to apply bankruptcy law (as
opposed to choice-of-law rules for free-standing state law causes of action) is part of a
more general problem of choice of law in federal question cases. For a discussion, see
Green, Presumption, supra note 74, at 1281–85; Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The
Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881, 958–60 (1986); Paul J. Mishkin, The
Variousness of “Federal Law”: Competence and Discretion in the Choice of National and State
Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 797, 808–10 (1957); Radha A. Pathak, Incorporated
State Law, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 823 (2011); Note, Applicability of State Conflicts Rules
When Issues of State Law Arise in Federal Question Cases, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1955).
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and state interests, but in the federal policies standing behind the statute that gives the federal court jurisdiction. In the end, I have concluded that the twin aims are implicated, to some extent, in every state
law action entertained by a federal court. In contrast, they do not
apply to federal courts entertaining federal causes of action. Nor do
they apply to state courts entertaining federal causes of action,
although the question is subject to vigorous (if veiled) disagreement
among the current members of the Supreme Court.
As we have seen, the twin aims can recommend that a federal
court use state rules whatever the relevant state supreme court would
say about the matter. The reason is the unique nature of the lower
federal court system, which was created by Congress and endowed
with jurisdiction over state law actions to address perceived deficiencies in the preexisting state court systems. Because federal jurisdiction
over state law actions is seen as subordinate to the jurisdiction of state
courts, a federal court’s discretion when creating procedural common
law is limited by the purposes for which it was granted jurisdiction.
The twin aims are fundamentally about separation of powers, not
federalism.
One important benefit of this conception of the twin aims is that
it can ease the pressure faced by federal courts in relatively unguided
Erie cases. Such cases are commonly understood as essentially concerning the division of lawmaking power between the federal government and the states. Seen in this light, the fluid and unpredictable
manner in which they are decided looks problematic.293 Under my
reading, in contrast, federal courts are often simply making a decision
about which federal common law rule will best serve competing federal interests. On the one hand, there is the interest—expressed in
the twin aims—recommending uniformity with forum state procedure. But this must be balanced against other federal interests recommending a federal common law rule that is uniform among federal
courts. So understood, the prospect of a mistaken decision is less serious. Rather than being an infringement upon state sovereignty, it is
293 For an example of such criticism in connection with Gasperini v. Ctr. for
Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996), see Earl C. Dudley & George Rutherglen,
Deforming the Federal Rules: An Essay on What’s Wrong With the Recent Erie Decisions, 92
VA. L. REV. 707, 708 (2006); C. Douglas Floyd, Erie Awry: A Comment on Gasperini v.
Center for Humanities, Inc., 1997 BYU L. REV. 267, 269–70 (1997); Jennifer S. Hendricks, In Defense of the Substance-Procedure Dichotomy, 89 Wash. U. L. Rev. 103 (2011).
Understood as a choice between federal and state law, Gasperini must have been
wrongly decided, for the amalgamation of federal and state standards the Court settled on could not possibly have been the result of a principled view about the division
of federal and state lawmaking power.
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simply a badly designed federal common law rule, with its costs felt
only by the federal government.
The twin aims and countervailing federal interests are not, however, the only consideration a federal court must face in a relatively
unguided case. Federal interests aside, a state may have a legitimate
interest in extending its rule to federal courts. Although, it has not
been the goal of this Article to determine the role that state interests
should play in relatively unguided Erie cases, I would like to end with a
few words about where I believe research on this matter should be
directed.
One problem is how a federal court can determine whether a
state is in fact interested in its rules applying in federal court, in the
sense that the Byrd bound-up test seeks to capture. Unless the question is certified, state courts will have no occasion to opine about
when the state’s rules follow the state’s cause of action into sister state
and federal courts.294 They have a reason to speak only of what rules
they should use. Whether their rules should be used in other court
systems is a problem that must be dealt with by those courts. As a
result, questions about whether the Byrd bound-up test is satisfied will
be dealt with only by courts that cannot provide authoritative answers.
The only way around this problem is the onerous process of certification, which no federal court, to my knowledge, has ever used in a
relatively unguided Erie case.295 Given the difficulty determining the
extent of state interests, federal courts would arguably be better off
giving up the Byrd test and relying on presumptions that are based on
more readily discernible characteristics of the rules at issue.296
But even if one assumes perfect knowledge about whether the
Byrd test is satisfied, there remain questions about whether it accurately captures a state’s power to extend its rules to federal courts.
The test appears over-inclusive, for it suggests that a state can displace
294 For a general discussion of this problem, see Green, supra note 85.
295 In both Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431
(2010), and Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996), members of the
Court had profound disagreements about whether a New York rule was bound up
with the New York actions brought in federal court. Compare Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at
1455–60 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment), with id. at 1469–72 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Compare Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 428–29 (Ginsburg, J.), and id. at 446–47 (Stevens, J., dissenting), with id. at 464–65 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Despite this
disagreement, no one thought to certify the question to the New York Court of
Appeals.
296 See, e.g., Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1457–60 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (adopting a rebuttable presumption that a rule that is formally designated by a
state as procedural is not intended to follow the state’s causes of action into other
court systems).
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federal procedural common law at will, simply by binding up a contrary state rule with the state law cause of action upon which the plaintiff sues. For example, a state could displace federal procedural
common law concerning service by binding up the state’s rules on
service with a state law cause of action.
The Byrd test not only appears over-inclusive, it also appears
under-inclusive. Can’t a state legitimately extend its rules to federal
courts without binding them up with a state law cause of action?
Assume, for example, that the New York Court of Appeals has held
that its attorney-client privilege law should be used by a federal court
in Pennsylvania entertaining a Pennsylvania cause of action, because
the relevant communications were made by the defendant in New
York City to a member of the New York bar.297 Isn’t this too an example in which New York has legitimately extended its rules to federal
court?
Finally, there is the problem of deciding how conflicts between
federal procedural common law and applicable state law should be
resolved. Justice Brennan’s language in Byrd suggests that federal procedural common law must always yield to a state rule that is bound up
with a state cause of action. But as the federal interests standing
behind the federal procedural common law rule become stronger and
the state interests become weaker, Brennan’s rule of priority starts
sounding implausible, particular as a statement of federal courts’ constitutional obligations.298
Eventually these and other questions must be faced. But before
the role of state interests in relatively unguided Erie cases can be ascertained, the very different role of the twin aims in such cases needs to
be explained and justified. Such has been the purpose of this Article.

297 See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Leggat, 904 S.W.2d 643 (Tex. 1995).
298 As Hanna made clear, Congress’s power to establish (and, if it wishes, to disestablish) the lower federal court system—augmented by the Necessary and Proper
Clause—gives it the power to regulate matters coming before a federal court that are
arguably procedural, that is, matters “which, though falling within the uncertain area
between substance and procedure, are rationally capable of classification as either.”
Hanna, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965); see also Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S.
22, 32 (1988) (reasserting this congressional power). Hanna suggests a rule of priority under which federal procedure trumps conflicting state law.
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